Structural Analysis of the Japanese Language Using Montague Grammar. by Facey, Kikuko Kitagawa
TSesis /245 
SZg/.
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE 
USING MONTAGUE GRAMMAR
Submitted for Doctor of Philosophy 
to the University of London
Kikuko Kitagawa Facey
ProQuest Number: 11010422
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11010422
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
16/t/zz
llAL 4
/•
ACKNOWLE DGEMENT S
I would like to express my thanks to Dr* J.E. Buse, 
who encouraged me to take up this topic and supervised me 
during this work. I am also grateful to Dr. Ewan Klein who 
offered rae friendship and advised me.
Since I had no formal training in philosophy, I have 
benefited from the teachings of philosophers and logicians.
My special thanks go to Dr. Hide IshigUro, who read Chapter 1 
of this thesis and gave important comments on it. I am 
grateful to Hidehisa Sakai, who answered my questions on his 
book. I would like to express a deep gratitude to Professor 
David Wiggins, who allowed me to attend his seminars and 
deepen my interest in philosophy. I have also benefited from 
lectures and seminars given by Dr. Hans Kamp and Colin McGinn. 
During this period, I have profited from discussions with 
Professor Herb Clerk, and Professor Richmond Thomason.
I am also grateful to all of my Japanese informants, 
especially, Miss Masako Okada. I would like to express my 
thanks to my parents who sent me many books on Japanese 
linguistics. My last and deepest thanks go to my husband, Owen, 
who gave moral support to my research and proof read my drafts.
This research has been partially supported by the 
Ouseley Memorial fund, University of London.
2 .
ABSTRACT
This thesis applies Montague’s theory of grammar 
to a fragment of ordinary Japanese and aims to provide 
a foundation for an explicit semantics of Japanese. The 
typological or transformational studies will be presented 
first as data and the corresponding Montague grammatical 
analyses will be proposed. In Chapter 1, Montague's 
theory of grammar is discussed, comparisons being made 
with Davidsonian truth conditional semantics and Chomskyan 
transformational grammar. In Chapter 2, subjects, 
adjectives and adverbs are analysed, in Chapter 3i 
complementation, in Chapter k reflexives, passives, 
causatives, and in Chapter 5 negation and factive 
presupposition.
The main theoretical concern is the relation between 
a logical syntax and linguistic syntax. It is hoped that 
a new linguistic framework will be developed from this 
study•
The other important theoretical concern is the 
relation between semantics and pragmatics.
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Chapter 1 Montague 1s theory of grammar 
and its impact on philosophy 
and linguistics
1.0. Introduction
Development of Montague’s theory of grammar did not 
end with his tragic death in 1971* hut continued on.
Montague’s theory had a great impact on both philosophers 
and linguists by combining logical semantics with the study 
of natural languages. Montague challenged not only 
Chomskyan linguistics, which was influential among American 
linguists at that time, but also Davidsonian trxith-conditional 
semantics which was at that time favoured by Anglo-American 
philosophers. Since good introductions to Montague grammar 
are available (Cf. R.H. Thomason: 1974; B.H. Partee: 1975;
D. Dowty et al: 1980), I will limit my discussion to some 
of the salient points.
1.1. Truth Theory v. Model Theory*
(i) Truth definition
Since Frege gave theoretical support to truth conditions, 
a relation between meaning and truth has been accepted by 
many philosophers, but the abstract notion of truth was not 
precisely defined until recently. It was Davidson (1967) 
who revolutionalized truth-conditional semantics by introducing 
Tarski’s notion of truth and satisfaction. He eliminated the 
intensional expression:
(1) s means that p
and replaced it by the T convention with the extensional 
connective;
(2) (T) s is T if and only if p
where s is a structural description of a sentence and p is a 
sentence itself, otherwise a translation of s in metalanguage.
This extensional semantics has been favoured by many 
philosophers, since it can sidestep the problem of analytic 
truth, but analytic truth has in its turn been severely 
attacked by Quine (1953)* However, this is far from an 
adequate theory of meaning. For instance,
(3) "Snow is white” is true if and only if 
grass is green.
In (3) two true sentences are paired, and (3) is certainly a 
true sentence, but ”Snow is white” does not mean that grass 
is green. To avoid this class of examples, Davidson had to 
add a formal and empirical constraint to his truth definition.
What is worse, this extensional semantics cannot 
handle modal notions such as those expressed in the following 
examples;
(4) It is necessary that water is HgO.
(5) It is possible that water is frozen.
Moreover,
(6) Pegasus is flying
is meaningful but it has no truth conditions from the noint 
of view of truth theory since it has no extension. Thus 
truth theory has difficulties in handling non-extensional 
constructions.
Truth theory defines truth as absolute truth, whereas 
model theory defines truth relative to a model (interpretation). 
Model theory is a branch of mathematical logic developed by 
Tarski and others. A model M for a language L is the structure 
a form U, F >  , where i) U is a non-empty set and ii) F is 
an interpretation function which assigns an element of U to
each of the proper names of L, a subset of U to each of
the basic CN's and basic IV's and a set of pairs of elements
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of U to each of the basic TV's.
Model theory was developed into possible world 
semantics by Kripke, Montague, Lewis and others. According 
to Montague (1974:145)f Carnap proposed to identify a model 
with a possible world. However, the proponents of possible 
world semantics rejected this identity and took a possible 
world as a primitive. Hence truth is not only relative to 
a model but to the possible worlds. Then (4) is true in 
all possible worlds and (5) is true in some possible worlds. 
Meanings are defined by Montague (1974:228) as "functions 
of two arguments...a possible world and a context of use." 
This semantics can handle intensional phenomena such as 
modals, counterfactuals, much more easily.
(ii) Structurally valid inference
Structurally valid inference is an inference by virtue 
of its syntactic categories, i.e. due to the way in which 
the sentence is built. For instance, in the following pairs 
of examples, we can infer (b) from (a) not by virtue of the 
meaning but by virtue of the syntactic category.
(7)a« John walks slowly, 
b. John walks.
(8)a. John is a clever man. 
b. John is a man.
(9)a* A friend of mine whose wife is old is nice to me.
b. A wife of a friend of mine is old.
(10)a. There is a book on the desk,
b. There is a book.
(11)a. John was killed by Mary, 
b. John was killed.
Davidson (1970:1*1*0 suggests that a structurally valid 
inference can provide a powerful rationale of the principle 
of corapositionality. To quote;
•’By saying exactly what the role of (a certain recurrent 
element) ' is and what the roles of the other significant 
features of the sentence are, we will have a deep explanation 
of why one sentence entails the other; an explanation that 
draws upon a systematic account of how the meaning of each 
sentence is a function of its structure."
I an* almost certain that this structurally valid 
inference is a universal semantic relation. For instance, 
Japanese has a tensed adjective, an example of which is given 
below.
(12)a. Hanako wa utuk u. sikatta hito da
beautiful-past person be
"Hanako is a person who was beautiful."
b. Hanako wa hito da
"Hanako is a person."
Even in the above example of a tensed adjective, structurally
valid inference holds. I have examined this inference using
examples (7) end (8) in the following languages: An^ari
(Ethiopia), Arabic, Bengali, Chinese, Hausa, Hindi, Japanese,
Korean, Malay, Thai and Persian. They all have this type of
structurally valid inference.
There are some exceptions to this inference. Observe
the following example:
(13)a. This is a fake watch, 
b. This is a watch.
(13)b. does not logically follow from (13)a* Adjectives like
"fake" "false" "possible" are excluded from this inference
but can be treated as sentence operators. Moreover, Idiomatic
expressions are excluded from this inference. Consider the
k
following example.
(l**)a. John is an old woman (« John is easily worried.) 
b. John is a woman.
Logicians say that (12)b. is a logical consequence of (12)a.
and for many years they have been trying to provide a
definition of logical consequence. The difficulty lies in
its intensionality, but Tarski (1956) defines it by using
model theory as follows;
The sentence X follows logically from the sentence 
of the class K if and only if every model of the 
class K is also a model of the sentence X.
Thus a model theory can account for structurally valid 
inference, whereas truth theory cannot show all of these 
inferences as valid. For instance, Evans (1976:208) points 
out that truth theory cannot account for the following 
inference, because it lacks discernment of "tall" in "taller 
than"•
(15) X is a tall man.
Y is taller than X.
Y is a man.
Therefore Y is a tall man.
This shows that in this respect truth theory is inadequate.
A model-theoretic account of comparatives which derives
\
"taller" from "tall" morphologically has been given by Kamp 
(1975) and Klein (1980).
(iii) Logical structure
Davidson (1970:145) says "to give the logical form of
a sentence is to describe it as composed of the elements the
theory isolates." Logical structure is the input to a theory 
of truth and it shows how to break up a sentence into parts. 
Davidson makes use of first-order predicate logic for his 
logical structure and extends it in his own way. He (1967) 
proposes that a sentence such as
(16) John walked uphill with a stick
should be rendered in the following logical form;
(17) (^©) ( (John walked e)<§>-(e was uphill )<$"
(e was with a stick) )
It means that there is an event e such that John walked
e was uphill e was with a stick. The first problem is
whether an event is an ontological primitive. Secondly, the
logical form has more serious difficulties in handling
intensional adverbs than prepositional phrases. For instance,
(18) Mary wisely studied and passed the examination.
(18) cannot have a logical form such that an event was wise, 
because the adverb "wisely" does not refer to the event but 
the subject. Thus Davidsonian logical forms fail with adverbs.
Montague rejects the existence of a theoretical 
difference between formal and natural languages and hence 
the surface syntactic structure turns out to be a logical 
structure. Montague’s disambiguated language which "generates 
exactly one family of syntactic categories" can be identified 
with logicAl structure. It includes a set of syntactic 
categories, a set of syntactic rules and so on. This level can 
be translated into intensional logic of higher-order as in the
The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English 
(cf. Montague, 197^5 henceforth PTQ). Montague (197^:263 fn) 
himself thought that the best approach is a direct interpret­
ation with the help of a translation procedure, which was 
realized in his Universal Grammar (cf. Montague:197^• 
henceforth UG) but he added that "it would introduce slight 
complications that need not be considered in PTQ," Therefore, 
the level of higher-order intensional logic is an expository 
device to give a systematic account of truth conditions. For 
instance, (19) will be translated into (20).
(19) Mary deliberately failed.
This can be simplified into (21) by a lambda conversion.
Then model theory interprets "deliberately" as denoting a 
function from the set of objects which failed to the set 
of objects which failed deliberately. Thus model theory 
analyses predicate adverbs as a function from properties of 
individuals to sets of individuals and can offer a richer 
semantics than truth theory.
(iv) Tense
Tarski was interested in formalized language, whereas 
Davidson (1969) attempts to construct a theory of truth for 
natural languages which include tense. Truth is a property 
of a sentence in formal languages, but Davidson makes truth 
a relation between a sentence, a speaker, and a time. Thus 
his general theory of truth for natural languages is 
defined as follows.
( deliberately' ( failed*))"*
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(21) deliberately1 (^ failed’) (m).
(22) Sentence s is true (as English) for speaker u 
at time t if and only if p.
Therefore,
(23) It is Tuesday.
(23) is true if and only if it is Tuesday at the time the 
speaker utters (23).
(24) John was tired yesterday.
(2k) is true if and only if John is tired on the day before 
the speaker utters (24).
However, this notion of truth cannot capture the 
context-sensitivity of tense. For instance, the truth-value
of
(25) John will come
changes depending on the context of use.
In the model-theoretic investigation of tense, which was
carried out by Montague and his associates, truth is a
7
property of sentence tokens not of sentence types. To take 
into account the possible contexts of use, Montague (1974) 
introduces indices which specify features which are relevant 
to the discourse. If the tense operator is the only indexical 
element in a sentence, the moments of time will be chosen 
as indices. If P is the one-place predicate "walk", the 
sense of P(V ) is a function from a moment i to the set of 
objects walking at i. Thus the model-theoretic approach 
can capture the context-dependency of tense better than 
truth theory.
Moreover if we extend model theory into a discourse 
model developed by Kamp (MS ), tense can be treated as discourse 
referents (cf. L. Karttunen:197&)• For instance, an indefinite 
noun phrase is considered to establish a discourse referent
”in case it justifies the occurrence of a coreferential 
pronoun or a definite noun phrase later in the text.”
Examples are as follows;
(26) Bill has a car. It is black.
(27) Bill doesn’t have a car. *It is black.
(28) There is a dog in a pond. The dog is swimming.
This thought was further extended into tense logic by
Karap, who suggests that tense should be determined in the 
discourse.
1.2 The notion of possible worlds.
The formal success of possible world semantics has 
attracted not only philosophers but also linguists. However, 
the notion of possible worlds seems to be a stumbling-block 
even to philosophers. One of the reasons is that there are 
disagreements about the fundamental notion of possible 
worlds among possible world semantionists themselves.
©
Lewis’ realist view of possible worlds is one of 
the most famous, but many philosophers seem to disagree 
with it. Lewis (1973:84) states;
Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are 
many ways things could have been besides the way they 
actually are. On the face of it, this sentence is an 
existential quantification. It says that there exist 
many entities of a certain description, to wit 
’ways things could have been.’ ••••• I prefer to 
call them ’possible worlds.’
Lewis believes that possible worlds exist as concrete worlds
in reality and our actual world only differs from possible
worlds in its indexicality. This realism implies that there
are more things than exist in this world and for example
Pegasus should exist as a living creature in some possible
worlds. The notion of possible worlds is ascribed to the
German philosopher Leibniz (16^6-1716), but his view of
possible worlds was never realistic. According to Leibniz,
God thought about all the possibilities of the universe
before creation and he created this universe by actualizing
the best one. This content of God's thought before creation
is identified with possible worlds but after creation the
possible worlds only existed as an idea. Therefore a possible
world is not a real world, just as a picture horse is not a
real horse, although we can say that there is a horse there
so long as it is common knovrledge that it is a picture.
Lewis (1968) also proposes a counterpart theory, while 
Kripke, Montague, and others maintain the method of transworld 
identities which claim that the same thing is allowed to be 
in several worlds. The counterpart relation is a relation 
of similarity, and hence your counterparts in other possible 
worlds resemble you closely in important ways, but they are not
exactly you. Therefore ”1 might have been a professor” 
means that ray counterpart is a professor in some worlds.
Lewis’ counterpart theory can avoid all the puzzles 
of transworld identity but it is also the source of some 
problems. Counterpart theory suggests that if an entity 
in another world is quite unlike me, it is not my counterpart. 
However, Feldman (1971) gives the following example;
(29) X could have been quite unlike what I in fact am ,, 
which is translated into (30) by Lewis' theory
(30) I have a counterpart who is quite unlike me.
(30) contradicts counterpart theory, but Lewis would say 
my counterpart resembles me in important ways even if it is 
apparently unlike. \nd when does a counterpart become 
sufficiently different from me to be considered not ray 
c ount eroart ?
Kripke (1971) criticizes Lewis' view of possible worlds
as taking the metaphor of possible worlds too seriously, and
suggests that counterfactual situations should not be
identified with possible worlds. When we talk about the
counterfactual situations in which say Mrs. Thatcher is not
a politician, we can still refer to the very same person Mrs.
Thatcher. Namely the rigid designator designates the same
object in all possible worlds where that object exists*
Krioke's view of possible worlds seems to be suitable.
Kripke (1972:267) says:
\ possible world isn't a distant country that we are 
coming across, or viewing through a telescope. Generally 
speaking, another possible world is too far away. Fven 
if we travel faster than light, we ir-on't get to it. A 
possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we 
associate with ..............
16.
Wiggins (1976) suggests that this postulational view would 
give a sounder foundation for possible world semantics.
Moreover, Kripke's arguments implies that possible 
worlds may exist. For instance,
(31) Water is «20.
(31) is a contingent identity statement of scientific discovery. 
Then Kripke (1971) argues that (31) is a necessary proposition 
because water is HgO in all possible worlds. Certainly, if 
it is not Ho0 but i^en i* i® Hydrogen Peroxide. When
an identity statement of scientific discovery is recognized 
as a definition, it turns out to be true in all possible 
worlds. If a contingent proposition turns into a necessary 
proposition, it cannot be denied that possible worlds may exist.
1.3* Transformational grammar and Montague grammar
(i) Universal grammar
The goal of transformational grammar was to reconstruct 
a native speaker's linguistic competence. Transformational 
grammarians believed that universal grammar was pre-programmed 
as "a cognitive structure with certain properties and 
principles." (Cf. N.Chomsky:1975i86) One of the reasons
why transformational grammar attracted many linguists was 
not only its new methodology but its overall philosophy of 
language. Before this, structural linguists believed that 
languages were different in unpredictable ways, and at the 
same time Quinean empiricism was compatible with these 
linguistics. Then Chomsky proposed the innateness hypothesis 
and he asked us to adopt a rationalist philosophical point 
of view of the human mind, which claims that knowledge of a
language is not only a product of experience but also of 
innate universals of language.
However, some recent psycholinguistic research suggests 
that children acquire languages only through communication 
exchange. Namely speech which is not addressed to the child 
is not acquired. For instance, according to Todd (1972), a 
hearing child of deaf parents could use sign languages 
fluently but neither spoke nor listened to speech, although 
a television set had been on at home. This seems to suggest 
that children are born with strong expectation to communicate, 
and it is their active minds that achieve language acquisition 
through communication exchange. Now many nsychologists 
believe that children bring certain operating principles 
which work on the process of learning languages regardless 
of the peculiarities of the languages. (Cf. D.I.Slobin:1973) 
These principles are considered to be closely related to 
linguistic universals, although some of them are language- 
specif ic•
Sir Karl Popper develops a similar view of language and 
mind. In the tradition of Western philosophy, the world 
consists of three sub-worlds; the first is the physical world; 
the second is the mental world; the third is the world of 
ideas in the objective sense and to which theories and 
languages belong. Philosophers like Plato regarded the 
third world as discoverable but beyond human intellect to 
construct, but philosophers like Locke believed that language 
is man-made and that language is a part of the first and 
second world. Popper (1972;159) takes the autonomy of the
third world and at the same time he admits that the third 
world is man-made. Therefore human languages are the product 
of human activity, although he does not specially deny 
inborn knowledge. According to Popper (1963:^7)» we are born 
with expectations to be fed, and to be loved. In the close 
relation between expectation and knowledge, we have an 
inborn knowledge. This knowledge is "psychologically or 
genetically a priori i.e. prior to all observational 
experience." And one of the most important expectations is 
that of finding regularity. This instinctive expectation 
seems to be important for language acquisition. What is 
inborn is not the knowledge of language but the instinctive 
expectation.
Popper (1972:206-255) also held the evolutionary 
theory of language which originates with his teacher, Karl 
3Uhler. He thinks languages evolve from lower function to 
higher functions such as the descriptive, argumentative 
functions of language. Descriptive functions of language 
determine truth or falsity and argumentative functions handle 
validity. In his view of evolution each organism is "a 
growing hierarchical system of plastic controls" and it 
evolves by the process of trial and error. If the evolutionary 
theory of language is correct, the logical structure of 
language that is the result of evolution, must be universal 
in any advanced language.
Montague himself did not discuss his own view of 
philosophy of language and mind, but only expressed his 
view of grammar explicitly. He was dissatisfied with 
Chomskyan linguistics because of its lack of semantic relevance,
but he said in the beginning of his "Universal Grammar":
"There is in my opinion no important theoretical 
difference between natural languages and the artificial 
languages of logicians; indeed, I consider it possible 
to comprehend the syntax and semantics of both kinds 
of languages within a single natural and mathematically 
precise theory. On this point I differ from a number 
of philosophers, but agree, I believe^ with Chomsky 
and his associates. It is clear, however, that no 
adequate and comprehensive semantical theory has yet 
been constructed, and arguable that no comprehensive 
and semantically significant syntactical theory yet exists."
(Cf. Montague: 197**»222 )
Instead of merely discussing language as many philosophers 
do, Montague proposed to analyze the syntax and semantics 
of languages by using a precise mathematical formalism; and 
in this sense Montague was close to Chomsky and his associates. 
Montague’s theory of grammar is a radical departure from 
the current philosophies of language.
However, the aim of his universal grammar is neither 
to seek for innate universals of language nor to support a 
rationalist view of the human mind. Montague aimed to 
construct a general theory of language which would provide 
an adequate and comprehensive semantic theory and a 
semantically significant syntactic theory. According to 
Montague, the basic aim of syntax is "to characterize the 
various syntactic categories." There are many different 
ways to do so, but that which Montague chose was a semantically 
significant syntax, i.e. one which can become a basis for 
semantic interpretations. And the one that Montague chose was 
a model-theoretic semantics "to characterize the notions of a 
true sentence (under a given interpretation) and of entailment."
(ii) Semantics
Among linguistic semantic theories, Katzian trans­
lational semantics seems to be closest to model-theoretic 
semantics. According to Seuren (197^;105) Katz, Fodor, and 
Postal were inspired by a model theory and the terms 
'projection rule' and * interpretation' were taken from a 
model theory. Thus both are compositional but Katzian 
semantics is not explicitly truth-conditional.
Katz (1972) is reluctant to refer to truth conditions 
and he states that the task of semantics is to account for 
synonymy, ambiguity, contradictoriness, entailrnent, etc. 
However, many people think that the first task of semantics 
is to give truth conditions and hence semantics without truth 
conditions is not semantics. Model-theoretic semantics not 
only gives truth conditions explicitly but also accounts for 
the above semantic relations. For instance, P is a 
contradictory of Q i.e. there is no possible world in which 
both are true and no possible world in which both are false.
P follows from Q i.e. there is no possible world in which Q 
is true and P is false. P is equivalent to Q i.e. in each 
possible world, P and Q have matching truth-values. (Cf. R. 
Bradley and N. Swartz;1979:5^-55)• Moreover, if we incorporate 
intensional logic into model-theoretic semantics, synonymy 
can be accounted for.
Katz believes semantics is about the relation between 
language and its literal meaning and hence semantics is to 
translate natural languages into mock-formal languages i.e. 
semantic representations. However, other people believe that
semantics is about the relation between language and the 
world and hence the role of semantics is to assign 
denotations to each linguistic expression. Model-theoretic 
semantics is an adequate theory of reference in this respect 
and one which can connect the language with the world. In 
Montague's theory of grammar, translation is used as a 
mediating tool between natural languages and model-theoretic 
interpretations, whereas translation is the final stage of 
semantics in Katzian semantics. Thus from this point of 
view Katzian semantics is not incorrect but incomplete and 
hence it can be integrated into model-theoretic semantics 
(cf. M. Cressvrell: 1978 ) •
The central feature of Katzian semantics is lexical 
decomposition. The lexicon is decomposed into a number of 
semantic markers such as (object) (physical) (human) etc.
As Cresswell (1978:19) points out, model-theoretic semantics 
does not need to specially explain this sort of lexical 
decomposition in terms of entailment. Uhen a native speaker 
knows that being a bachelor entails being a man, he naturally 
knows that in any world where X is a bachelor X is a man. 
Nevertheless, model-theoretic semantics is not incompatible 
with lexical decomposition. For instance, Montague (PTQ) 
gives a meaning postulate which defines seek in terms of 
try to find. Montague's theory of grammar is able to handle 
lexical semantics in this way, but the abundant use of 
meaning postulates complicates the semantic theory.
Dowty (1979) suggests that formal semantics should be able 
to handle word meaning. However, some recent psycholinguistic 
research (cf. W. Marslen-lvilson and Welsh: 1978; E.V.Clark and
H.T1. Clark;1979) shows the necessity of integration of 
linguistic and contextual-pragmatic information in word 
comprehension.
(iii) Categories
Transformational grammarians determine syntactic 
categories by the application of transformationa• Chomskyan 
linguists regard two items as belonging to different 
categories if any transformat ion treats them differently.
For instance, Jackendoff (1972:100) makes a distinction 
between auxiliary verbs and main verbs because they behave 
differently in some transformations. On the other hand, 
Generative Semanticists regard two items as belonging to 
the same category if any transformation treats them alike.
For instance, Ross (19&9) regards adjective phrases as NP's 
because some transformations treat them alike. Thus the 
status of syntactic categories was brought into dispute.
J. McCawley (1977) argues for the non-existence of 
syntafctic categories in transformational grammar. He suggests 
that "When linguists supposedly have been talking about 
syntactic categories; they really have been talking about 
something else," having noticed that the application of a 
transformation does not depend on the syntactic category.
For instance, proposing does not always apply to the particles 
and prepositional phrases. Observe the following example 
from Jackendoff (cf. J. McCawley;1977)*
(32) Into the opera house raced Harpo*
(33) Home raced Jack.
(3*0 Buried here lies the producer of "A night at the opera”
(35) Into the canyon rode John Wayne.
(36)* Into the canyon fired John Wayne.
In (3*0, the preposed element is not a prepositional phrase, 
and in (36) the preposing of the prepositional phrase is 
not acceptable. Therefore the generalization that preposing 
applies to a certain syntactic category fails. Instead,
J. McCawley suggests that it "appears to apply to expressions
that give the location or direction of the subject.” If
correct, some applications of this transfonnation seem to 
depend on meaning and hence a transformational theory of 
syntactic categories is unreliable.
In contrast, Montague chose to have syntactic 
categories which are based on a categoriel grammar. This 
has its origin in Edmund Husserl*s "semantic categories,” 
and was introduced into Polish logic by Lesniewski and 
developer? into a more accessible version by Ad jukiewic:', 
(1935)* A categorial grammar as well as Russell's theory
g
of types (cf. B. Russell; 1903 : *523) can provide a solution 
to the problem of syntactic connection - the condition 
under which a word pattern is syntactically connected. 
Semantic categories are divided into two kinds, i.e. basic 
categories and functor categories. Adjukiewicz had two 
basic categories - the name category ”n ” and sentence 
category ”s”. Functor categories are derived from the 
combination of the name category and sentence category, and 
assigned a fractional index as follows. An index "s/n” is
2 lu
John walks slowly
walks slowly, s/n
assigned to intransitive verbs which form a sentence with 
a name and an index "n/n” to attributive adjectives which
form a name with a name. Consider the following analysis 
trees•
(37)
J ohn, n
walks, s/n slowly, s/n/s/n
(38) John finds a frog. s
John, n finds a frog, s/n
f inchi^s/n/i^^ n
As in algebra, we find a cancellable relation between indexes 
and the cancellation which is annlied from the bottom and 
goes to the top will yield "s" as the final derivative.
The following example which is not syntactically connected 
does not have a single index as the final derivative.
(39) * John if young.
n s/s n/n
Thus we note; (i) syntactically connected expressions can
be divided into parts which can go to the nth order; this
parts to whole relation is generally called the Fregean 
principle of compositionality, (ii) in every level a 
cancellation rule will apply, (iii) the final derivative 
is a single index. A nximber of logicians have been attracted 
to this Polish logical form, (a) because of its formal, 
elegance in its recursive definition of categories, (b) because
its mechanical procedure of testing syntactic connection,
(c) because of the isomorphism between syntax and semantics.
Both categorial grananar and phrase structure grammar 
are mathematically oriented and they proved to be identical 
(cf. Y. Bar-Hillel et al.t i960). Namely every language 
represented by a categorial grammar can also be described 
by a phrase structure grammar. However, one of the 
advantages of categorial grammar is that it is semantically 
conceived i.e. based on Russell's theory of types, and 
hence its syntactic category can be systematically translated 
into the semantic type. Montague (197^:260) formulates the 
following translation rules.
Fie) = e,
F(t) = t,
F( A/B) m F (A//B) =«?,F(B)> , f ( A »  
whenever A,B 6 Cat.
Chomsky's phrase structure grammar is based on the 
autonomy of syntax and its labels such as NP and VP, but 
these are nothing but unanalyzable symbols which have no 
semantic relevance. Thus a categorial grammar is prefer-able 
as underlying semantic structure.
Footnotes
1. I am indebted to the Bedford seminars for this,
2. A fuller description of set theory is given in Robert 
Wall's Introduction to Mathematical Linguistics (1972).
3, This is expanded by G, Evans (197&).
4, This example is given by J.F. Buse (personal communication).
r>. V/e can write either A- 1 ' ' ^  ^
or equivalently ^ - —  7L ~
6. The rule is that a formula of the form A. £ ’ ' ' ~ ^7(a)
tnay be converted to a logically equivalent formula of
the form  ^— .... flj by the principle of lambda
conversion (cf. A. Church:19^1) •
o.k. X ' c i K l V  i D ) (H(z-J) ' J ( j )
(cf. D.R.Powty:1978b).
7. A sentence type is an abstract entity which is independent 
of its use, while a sentence token is "an occurrence of
a sentence type in a particular context of use."
(Cf. P. Halvorsen and W. Ladusaw:1979:212).
8. "Every prepositional function 0"(x) - so it is contended - 
has, in addition to its range of truth, a range of 
significance, i.e. a range within which x must lie if 0 x  
is to be a proposition at all, whether true or false.
This is the first point in the theory of types;"
(Cf. B. Russell;1903,523).
27.
Chapter 2: Japanese as a Formal Language
2.0. Introduction
«
During the last two decades, Japanese syntax has been 
exhaustively examined by generative grammarians and a number 
of interesting linguistic facts discovered. However, the 
area of semantics was largely ignored, or the problems of 
semantics were pushed into the area of syntax. This thesis 
applies Montague's theory of grammar to a fragment of 
ordinary Japanese and aims to provide an explicit semantics 
for Japanese. Since it cannot be assumed that the readers 
are familiar with Japanese, its typological characteristics 
are introduced. This presentation owes a great deal to 
Kuno's work (1973» 1978a).
(i) Japanese as an SOV language
Japanese has a basic word order of S(ubject) - 
O(bject) - V(erb). Except for the rigid constraint that verbs 
must come at the sentence-final position, word-order is 
relatively free.
(l)a. Taroo ga Hanako o horaeta.* "Taro praised Hanako."
Taro sub obj praised.
b. Hanako o Taroo go horneta.
*c. Horneta Taroo ga Hanako o.
(ii)The notion of subject in Japanese
One of the traditional grammarians, Mikami (1972),
claimed that there was no subject in Japanese and that the
particle ga_ was the nominative case-maker. One of the reasons
for his claims was that Japanese has no subject-verb agreement
as found in European languages. But Shibatani (1978) pointed 
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out that the process of subject-honorification and reflexization
which are triggered by one particular NP (Subject) is 
comparable to subject-verb agreement.
Generative grammarians syntactically define the subject 
as the first NP. Quoting the following example which includes 
two case-markers ga t
(2) John ga Mary ga sukida
John sub Mary obj like
"It is John who likes Mary." 
Kuno (1978a) stated that the fact that (2) cannot mean that
Mary is fond of John shows that the first NP is a subject.
This notion of subject considerably clarified analysis of the 
Japanese language and has practical advantages.
(ii) Subjectless constructions
Japanese subjects are often omitted but most of them 
are recoverable from the context. For example, observe the
following:
(3) Utukusiinaal 
"Beautiful1"
If (3) is uttered when the speaker is viewing Mt. Fuji, the
subject of (3) must be Mt. Fuji. However, there are some
subjectless constructions whose subjects are not recoverable
from the context. For example,
(^) Kaji dal 
"Firei"
(3) Koocha dal
"Tea, please."
(iv) Wa and ga
An English sentence "The sea is blue" can be 
translated into either (6) or (7)•
(6) Umi ya aoi (generic reading)
sea blue
(7) Umi aoi (event reading)
sea blue
That is, Japanese morphologically distinguishes where English 
need not.
The various uses of* wa and ga were surveyed by Kuno
(1973) and reduced to:
Wa has thematic or contrastive use and the thematic wa is
either generic or anaphoric.
(8) Kuzira wa honyuu-doobutu da 
whale mammal be
!IA whale is a mammal." (generic)
(9) Ah, inu jga hasitteiru. Ano inu wa Taroo no da.
Look dog running That dog Taro's be.
(anaphoric)
"Look.' A dog is running. The dog is Taro's."
(10) Taroo wa kxtaga, Hanako wa konakatta
came but did not come
"Taroo came, but Hanako did not." (contrastive)
Ga has both descriptive and exhaustive-listing use.
"Only the subject of action verbs, existential verbs, and 
adjectives/nominal adjectives that represent changing states" 
(Cf. S.Kuno:1973;^9-50) can take the descriptive Jga, while 
there are no such restrictions in the use of the exhaustive- 
listing ga.
(11) Ame ga hutteiru. 
rain falling.
"It is raining." (descriptive)
(12) Sora j£a akai . 
sky red
"Looki The sky is red." (descriptive)
(11) is a neutral description of some action, and (12) is a 
neutral description of some temporary state.
In the following examples, ga has exhaustive-listing 
interpretations, otherwise they are ungrammatical•
(13) Inu ga ^oeru
dogs bark "It is dogs which bark.”
(14) Taroo j£a Hanako ga sukida.
like
"It is Taro who likes Hanako."
The semantic function of wa and £a are described by Mikarai 
(1963) as follows:
unstressed stressed
wa thematic contrastive
ga descriptive exhaustive-listing
(v) Japanese as a postpositional language
BeingoiSOV language, Japanese is a postpositional
language. Case markers follow noun phrases including
common nouns and proper nouns, quantifier-like particles
which correspond to English "even" and"only" follow noun
phrases, and conjunctions follow sentence-final verbs.
Moreover, there are some sentence-final particles which
express the speaker’s attitude.
(13) Tori ga tondeiru (case marker) 
bird flying
"A bird is flying."
(16) Tori sae uttateiru (quantifier-like particle) 
bird singing
"Even a bird is singing."
(17) Taroo wa seikoo sitaga, Hanako wa sipoaisita (conjunction)
succeed failed
"although Taro succeeded, Hanako failed."
(18) Kore wa hon des a. yo. (sentence-final particle) 
this book be
"I am telling you that this is a book."
(vi) Nominal phrases
As one of the SOV languages, nominal modifiers 
which include adjectival, genitive expressions, relative 
clauses, demonstratives, numerals, classifiers, etc., 
precede nouns.
(19) omosiroi hon (adjective)
"an interesting book."
(20) watasi no hon (genitive)
"my book"
(21) Kono hon (demonstrative)
"this book"
(22) ni-satu no hon (numeral; classifier)
"two books"
(23) watasi ga Kaita hon (relative clause)
"the book which I wrote"
Note that relative clauses do not require relative pronouns
in Japanese.
(vii) Pronouns and demonstratives
Some traditional Japanese grammarians do not
recognize pronouns as a part of speech. One of the reasons
is that pronouns are derived from nominal expressions: boku 
’servant’ - I, kimi ’lord’ - you, watakusi ’personal' - I, 
otaku ’your house' - you.
Unlike English, they can regularly be modified by adjectives.
(2^)a. ookii kare
* big he
b. sutekina anata
* nice you.
Moreover, anaphoric pronouns do not appear on the surface.
Kuroda (1965b, published in 1979) named them "zero-pronouns"
and they are marked as 0 in the following examples;
(25)a. Taroo wa 0 imooto ga sulcida
sister like
’’Taro likes his sister."
b. Taroo wa 0 yasumitai toki ni yasumu
rest want when rest
"Taro takes a rest when he wants."
Note that zero-pronouns can be considered to be generated 
as a null element and do not necessarily have to be
considered as deleted by a transformation.
On the other hand, Japanese pronouns have indexical
use, that is, they refer to something or someone in a
context. For instance,
(26) Watasi wa nihonjin desu
I Japanese be
"I am Japanese"
In (26) "watasi" refers to a speaker and the context 
determines who the speaker is.
However, in comparison with English pronouns, the 
uses of Japanese pronouns are very limited. For instance, 
Geach's (1962) "pronouns of laziness" are replaced by the 
simple repetition of their antecedent noun phrases in 
J apanese.
(27)a. A man who loves his wife is wiser than 
one who hates her.
b. Zibun no tuma o aisuru otoko wa
self’s wife love man
Zibun no tuma o nikumu otoko yori kasikoi
self’s wife hate man than wise
(Lit.) "A man who loves self’s wife is wiser than 
one who hates self's wife.
Evan’s (19&0) E-type pronoun whose denotation is
fixed by a description, is replaced by the repetition of the
antecedent noun phrase in Japanese. Observe the following
English and Japanese example.
(28)a. Mary has children and John heats them.
b. Mary ni wa kodomo ga aru sosite
children have and
John wa sono kodomo o utu 
those children beat
(Lit.) "Mary has children and John beats those children."
As this is a general construction, we conclude that there
ore neither "pronouns of laziness" nor E-type pronouns in
Japanese•
In addition, Japanese has three kinds of demonstrative
(29) pronoun determiner place
nearer to the speaker kore kono koko
nearer to the hearer sore sono soko
far from the speaker _. , are ano asoKoand the hearer
(viii) Verbs
Japanese verbs are neutral in person, number, or 
gender, but they are inflected for tense, mode, and 
subordinating types;
(30) Verb ’eat*
non-past tabe-ru
past tabe-ta
intentional tabe-yoo
imperative tabe-ro-yo
subjunctive tabe-reba
gerundive tabe-0
continuative tabe-te
Verbs can be followed by a series of auxiliaries as
the following example.
(31) Taroo wa nori o tabe-sase-rare-tai
seaweed obj eat-cause-passive-desiderative
"Taro wants to be made to eat seaweed."
There is a constraint of the ordering of auxiliaries and
hence the following sequence is ungrammatical.
(32) * tabe-tai-rare-sase.
Verbs can be divided into transitive and intransitive, 
with the transitive and intransitive counterparts having a 
morphological contrast.
(33)
’’open”
"change”
"wail"
"drop"
intransitive
aku
kawaru
matu
otiru
transitive
akeru
kaeru
matasu
otosu
(ix) Adjectives
N.V. Smith (1980) states that it is part of the 
folklore of linguistics that Japanese has no adjectives.
This seems to have resulted from the fact that some
Japanese adjectives do not require copulas to form predicates.
For instance,
(34) Taroo wa wakai
young "Taro is young."
This kind of adjective is called an "i-adjective", because 
it ends with /i/ in non-past forms. However, some adjectives 
are followed by copulas:
(35) Taroo wa genki da "Taro is fit and well."
This kind of adjective is called a "nominal adjective", or
a "na-adjective", because it behaves like a nominal and its
attributive form ends with /na/.
Thus Japanese has two kinds of adjectives and they 
are inflected as follows:
(36)
non-past attributive 
11 predicative
past attributive
” predicative
subjunctive 
gerundive 
continuative
i-adjective
wakai
wakai
wakakatta
wakakatta
wakakerebe
wakaku
wakakute
na-adjective
genkina
genkida
genkidatta
genkidatta
genkinaraba
genkide,-ni
We will demonstrate that these forms are not only 
morphologically but also syntactically distinct from verbs 
and nouns. Namely there are some syntactic processes which 
differentiate adjectives from verbs. For instance, only 
verbs can occur with the following predicates.
(37) verb "taberu" adjective "wakaj 1
-masu ’’polite”
-siraau "perfective” 
-rareru "passive”
-tai "desiderative”
tabemasu
tabetesimau
taberareru
tabetai
*wakamasu
♦wakasimau
♦wakarareru
♦wakatai
(a) Unlike verbs, adjective stems can function as adverbs, 
when i-adjectives stems take /ku/ and na-adjective stems 
take /ni/.
(38) kodorao wa tanosiku asobu 
children pleasantly play
"The children play pleasantly.”
(39) Taroo wa sinkenni kangaeru
seriously think
"Taro thinks seriously.”
(b) Adjective stems turn into nouns, taking the suffix 
/ini/, /sa/, /Re/. Na-adjectives take only the suffix /sa/.
(i-adjective) tanosi - 
" sabisi -
" samu
(na-adjective) sizuka 
” yutaka
tanosimi
sahisisa
samuke
sizukasa
yutakasa
"pleasure” 
"loneliness" 
"coldness" 
"quietness" 
"affluency"
Traditionally included among na-adjectives are words of 
Chinese origin such as kenkoona "healthy" which do not 
take the suffix /sa/, and have stems that can still 
function as nouns.
(40) kenkoona hito wa siawaseda 
healthy person happy
"A healthy person is happy." (attributive)
(41) kodomo wa kenkooda 
children healthy
"The children are healthy." (predicative)
(42) kenkoo ga mottomo taisetuda 
health most important
"Health is most important." (noun)
In (42), kenkoo is followed by the case marker and functions 
as a noun, whereas sizuka is not followed by the case marker.
(43) * sizuka ga mottomo taisetuda 
"Quietness is most important."
Thus na-adjectives of Japanese origin can be treated as
adjectives, but what have traditionally been called na-
adjectives should be excluded from the adjectival class
when of Chinese origin.
Other interesting characteristics of Japanese
adjectives are summarized below.
(a) Adjectives can modify pronouns and proper names
(44)a. isogasii kare *busy he
b. isogasii Taroo ?busy Taro
(b) Not only predicative but also attributive adjectives 
are tensed.
(4^ )a. utukusikatta hito *beautiful - past person
beautiful-past person
to. atukatta natu *hot - past summer
hot-past summer
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(c) Adjectives are not inflected for the comparative and 
superlative. They add yori "than" to form the comparative 
and mottomo ’’most” or itifran ’’first1' to form the superlative
(46) Hanako wa Mariko yori wakai
than young
’’Hanako is younger than Mariko.”
(47) Hanako wa itiban wakai
first young
’’Hanako is the youngest.”
(x) Adverbs
(a) Morphology of adverbs
Many adverbs derive from adjectives, when i-adjective 
stems take /ku/ and na-adjective stems take /ni/.
(48) a . utulcusii -----------  utukusiku
beautiful beautifully
Some adverbs are of nominal origin:
(49)a. dan-dan "gradually”
b. zen-zen "at all”
Japanese has many onomatopoeic adverbs:
(50)a. siku-siku ’’sobbingly”
b. sito-sito ’’quietly"
Many manner adverbs are often followed by the suffix to.
(51)«* yukkurito "slowly”
b. hakkirito "clearly”
c. nombirito "without haste"
Sentential adverbs are often formed from adjectives, and 
followed by the exclamatory particle m o .
(52) Negekawasikumo Taroo wa jisatusita 
regrettably committed suicide
"Regrettably, Taro committed suicide."
(53) Saiwainimo, Hanako wa gookakusita 
fortunately passed exam
"Fortunately, Hanako passed the exam."
Subject-oriented adverbs, which express some additional 
information about the subject (cf* R*S. Jackendoff;1972), 
are also followed by the particle m o .
(54) Ziroo wa kasikokumo osoku kita
wisely late came
"Jiro wisely came late."
(b) Syntax of adverbs
Japanese sentence adverbs come at the beginning of 
the sentence and subject-oriented adverbs come after the 
subject. In distinction from English, predicate adverbs 
precede verbs. Observe the following examples.
(55) Kanarazilsimo hito wa sinu.(sentence adverb)
"Necessarily a person dies."
(56) Taroo wa orokanimo uso o tuita.(subject-oriented adverb) 
"Taro stupidly told a lie."
(57) Harako wa dan-dan futtota.(predicate adverbs)
"Harako put on a weight gradually."
2.1. The Japanese particles wa and j^ a
It is well known that some English sentences can be 
translated into Japanese in either of two ways. For example, 
the sentence
(58) The sea is blue
is ambiguous between a generic reading and an event reading.
In Japanese the generic reading is translated into a wa-sent eiTC e 
and an event reading into a ga-sentence as in the following
examples.
(59)a. U-mi wa aoi.
sea blue
b. li-nii ga aoi 
sea blue
There are many other uses of wa and jga, but here I am 
concerned with the above semantic distinction.
Following Kuroda (1972), I define the generic usage 
of wa in a far wider sense than that generally used in 
philosophy. I call a statement "generic” when it refers to
*
a "general, habitual, or dispositional state of affairs." 
Examples involving generic wa are as follows:
(60)a. Inu wa hasiru.
dog run "Dogs run."
b. Taroo wa hasiru.
Taro run "Taro runs."
c. Taroo wa kasikoi
Taro wise "Taro is wise."
I regard a statement as having an event reading when it 
refers to "a particular occurrence of an event or a process," 
and in Japanese it takes the descriptive jga. Examples are
as follows:
(61)a. Inu jra hasitteiru
dog running "Some dogs are running."
b. Sora ga akai
sky red "LookI The sky is red."
In transformational grammar, an attachment transformation
was proposed by Kuroda (19&5) to handle wa-sentences, and
a thematic NP node was postulated by Kuno (1973) in the
deep structure to handle thematic wa-sentences which include
the above generic sentences. However, neither Kuroda nor
Kuno presented an explicit semantics for wa and ga.
The use of Montague grammar in Japanese was pioneered
by the Japanese philosopher Sakai (1979)* In his work he
excludes the contrastive vra and considers the thematic ga
and the generic wa only. He compares the following ga-s entence
with the corresponding wa-sentence,
(62)a. Ie j^ a katamuiteiru.
house leaning "The house is falling down."
b. Ie wa katamuiteiru.
house leaning "The house is leaning over."
and suggests that wa-formations "put the whole sentence into
a modal mood, that is, necessity." (Cf. H. Sakai:1980;35)
If the corresponding ga-sentence is represented as s, the
wa-sentence is translated as
(63) Q
This means that s is necessarily true and hence s is true 
in all possible worlds. This works for some limited cases 
of generic sentences, as for instance,
(64) Inu wa doobutu da.
dog animal be "Dogs are animals."
where dogs cannot be human beings but are animals in all
possible worlds. However, if Sakai is right,
(65) Sora wa aoi
sky ~ blue "The sky is blue."
(65) should mean that necessarily the sky is blue. However,
I often find the sky grey, especially in England. Sakai 
proposes to re-interpret "necessity" as "understandable for" 
or "able to fix up a general agreement of all those who 
partake in the situation in which the sentence in case is
uttered," and he claims that this is a unique Japanese way
of thinking.
However, no matter how possible worlds are interpreted, 
necessary truth is objective truth in all possible situations
as in
(66) Mizu wa HgO da
water H?0 be "Necessarily water is HgO."
The following wa-sentence cannot be true in all possible
worlds.
(67) Inu wa hoeru.
dog bark "Dogs bark."
(68) Otoko wa onna o aisuru.
men women love "Men love women."
(69) Kyooju wa atarasil kangae o umidasu. 
professors new ideas generate
"Professors generate new ideas."
In (67) it is not difficult to find a non-barking dog, and 
in (68) there are some men that do not love women. And it 
is arguable whether all professors produce new ideas.
Therefore I conclude that not all of the wa-sentences can 
be translated into necessary truth, and hence I cannot 
accept Sakai’s translation. I will exclude generic identity 
statements such as (64) and Kripke’s (1972) statements of 
theoretical identification such as (66) from the remainder.
My analysis was suggested by analogy with Carlson’s 
(1977) unified analysis of the bare plural. Some bare plurals 
require universal quantification but some bare plurals 
require existential quantification. Observe the following 
examples of Carlson's.
(70) Doctors are wise.
(71) Doctors tried to save the dying boy.
Some people say that bare plurals are ambiguous between 
universal and existential quantification, but Carlson 
proposes to treat the bare plural as a proper name. This 
is not a new idea among linguists, Postal (1969) having 
already noticed the striking similarity between the bare 
plural and a proper name in the following examples.
(72)a. Slim is so-called because of his slender build.
b. Cardinals are so-called because of their colour.
c. Machine guns are so-called because they fire mechanically.
In these examples, the so of so-called denotes slim, 
cardinals, machine guns respectively and the bare plural 
functions as a name.
According to Carlson, both (73a) and (73h) are ambiguous. 
However, the native speaker of southern England did not 
have an event reading for (73*0* Therefore it is interesting 
how far we can identify the bare plural with a proper name.
On the other hand, Carlson's analysis of (73h) seems to be 
less controversial than his analysis of the bare plurals.
event readings as follows: the predicate "run" is ambiguous
between a kind-level predicate and a stage-level predicate.
However, the bare plural does not always behave
exactly like a proper name. For example, consider the
following sentences whose interpretations were given by
a native speaker of southern England.
(73)a. Dogs ran. 
b. Fido ran.
(generic)
(generic or event)
His analysis notes the ambiguity between generic and
(74)a. Generic reading b. Event reading
Fido ran Fido ran
ran (kind-level) Fido ran (stage-Fido
level)
Fido: K ? V? (jJ Fido: X . f y/P(j')
ran : \ x  3  2ran: run"
translation: run"(f) translation (reduced):
r u n ’l l ) }
Here R (z,x) means that z is a stage of x and Carlson 
regards a stage as a time-slice portion of existence.
Then in the event reading what is running is not the 
individual but a stage of the individual.
However, many philosophers have a different viewpoint 
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on this matter. There is an extensive philosophical
literature dealing with ’events.* Among these I find Von
Wright's (1963) definition of events to be more natural
than Davidson's (1967)* Von Wright defines an event as
"an ordered pair of two states of affairs." Then the event
is "the change or transition from the state of affairs
which obtains on the earlier occasion to the state of
affairs which obtains on the latter occasion." The first
state of affairs is called the initial-state and the second
the end-state. The event of opening a window consists of
the initial-state when the window is closed and the end-state
when the window is open. Kamp (1980) regards an event as a
change from one state p into another state q which is
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incompatible with p. On the other hand, Davidson regards 
an event as an ontological primitive, and claims that 
most action sentences do not refer to the initial-state.
However, some linguistic evidence supports the temporal 
segmentability of an event. For instance, Freed (1979) 
demonstrates that English aspectual verbs refer to the 
particular time segments of events named in the complement. 
According to her, keep, continue, stop, quit and cease can 
refer to the ongoing part of events, but start refers to the 
initial state and in contrast begin refers to the ongoing part 
of the event. Observe the following examples given by her.
V5.
(75)a. Barbara began to study for her exams 
and she did some studying,
b, Barbara started to study for her exams
last week, but then she didn't do any studying.
However, not all native speakers of English agree with her
intuition and hence the distinction between start and begin
is arguable.^
Now I would like to point out that some Japanese
verbs refer to the initial-state, which is considered to be
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a preparatory stage. Observe the following Japanese examples,
(76)a. Taroo wa e o kakikaketaga, kekkyoku wa
picture of draw-start after all 
though
nani mo kakanakatta, 
anything draw-not-past
"Taro half-started drawing a picture, but 
he did not do any after all.”
b. Taroo wa kushami o sikaketaga, kekkyoka wa sinakatta 
sneeze do-start after all did not
though
"Taro half-started sneezing, but did not after all.”
Thus at least in Japanese there is linguistic evidence which 
supports the initial-state. Therefore Von Wright's definition $ 
of events is prefer-able.
If some events are temporally segmentable, the 
individual that can be involved in events must have the 
temporal dimension. I regard this temporal dimension of 
the individual as a stage, which is a particular state of 
the individual at a particular time. According to Dana 
Scott (1970), these particulars form some kind of abstract 
object, in which case stages cannot perform actions and 
hence cannot be predicated. Although linguists can tolerate 
Carlson's formulation of an event reading as a tool for 
linguistic analysis,^ it seems to pose a problem to philosophers.
Next let us consider a generic reading, Carlson 
(1977:^51) defines a ’generic sentence* as any sentence 
that attributes a property to the individual that serves 
as the subject of the sentence. The first question is 
whether or not a generic statement has a truth-value.
Von Wright (1963:23) makes a distinction between generic 
and individual propositions, and says, "the individual 
proposition has a uniquely determined truth-value, it is 
either true or false, but not both. The generic proposition 
has, by itself, no truth-value. It has a truth-value only 
when coupled with an occasion for its truth or falsehood; 
that is, when it becomes 'instantiated' in an individual 
proposition." He seems to suggest that there is a truth- 
value link (cf. J. McDowell;1978) between a generic and 
individual proposition.
However, a generic proposition does not always have 
a truth-value automatically when coupled with an individual 
proposition. It seems to me that the generic proposition 
is linked to the individual proposition by memory, thought, 
or knowledge. For instance, if I am asked whether sealions 
bark or not, I will go back to my memory and confirm that 
I have heard sealions barking in Regent's Park Zoo. This 
link is not always direct. I have not heard whales singing, 
but I say I know that whales sing. Thus the truth or falsity 
of the generic proposition depends on our stored knowledge. 
Thus this process is not logical but cognitive.
The next question is what decides whether a proposition 
is generic or individual. According to Von Wright (1963:23), 
it is not the occurrence of individuals among its constituents 
but the logical nature of the concept of the predicate.
That Brutus killed Caesar is an individual proposition, 
because a person can be killed only once, whereas that 
Brutus kissed Caesar is a generic proposition, because 
a person can be kissed by another more than once. It is 
arguable whether that Brutus kissed Caesar is a generic 
proposition. However, what decides whether a proposition 
is generic or individual seems to depend on the semantics 
of the predicate. In the case of "Fido ran," which is 
ambiguous between a generic reading and event reading, the 
ambiguity ought to result from the predicate "ran" rather 
than the individual "Fido."
Although the semantics of generic statements is 
still an unsolved problem, Carlson's later development of 
a 6 predicate operator seems to be in the right direction.
He posits a 6 predicate operator which maps predicates 
that apply to stages of individuals to predicates that 
apply to individuals, and regards this process as a cognitive 
process of generalization. I diverge slightly from this, 
namely I take a Generic predicate operator as mapping 
from predicates of basic expression to kind-level predicates. 
This is because I think a stage cannot be predicated and 
hence predicates ought not to apply to stages of individuals. 
Therefore "dogs bark" would be translated as follows.
(77) (d) (A GAbark») = G (A bark» ) (d)
This Generic predicate operator has no morphological form 
in English but Carlson (1980) suggests that seventy languages 
represent it morphologically in the surface.
48.
We can now reconsider a previously given Japanese
example of a generic sentence (78),
(78) Inu wa hasiru
dog run "Dogs run,"
Because the common noun inu is referring to all natural
kinds of dogs it is not difficult to consider it denoting
an individual. Thus the rule which converts CN (common
nouns) into T (terms) will have to be formulated as follows,
S.2. If<3 6 PCN, then F 1( a ) ^ P T , where = ) > J T
T,2. If 6 Pc^ and translates as , then F^(cX)
translates as P *!*(&£,* I /^ Q  £/? ( X KJ )
Then sentence (78) will be analyzed as below.
%
(78) Inu-wa hasiru, t
2
wa - hasiru ••••••• G (A hasiru')
f 3
inu,^T h a s i r u , ••••••••••• hasiru
inu = JVPN/P(i)
inu T
hasiru = hasiru* 
wa - hasiru = G(^ hasiru')
Here we notice that wa corresponds to a Generic predicate 
operator and that it can be regarded as a surface reflex 
of it. The rule which converts a predicate of basic 
expressions into a kind-level predicate is formulated as 
follows•
S.4. If ^  6 Pjy» F3Q )  £> Pjy, , Where F^(a) = va Iv,
T.4. If ^  6 Pjy and translates as ^  ' , F^ (c^ v) translates as 
G<Ad').
*
z*9.
In addition, we need the following rule which combines T 
with IV (intransitive verbs) and form a sentence.
s . 3 . If a  6 P T . an<i/3 £ P I v . F 2 (a,/3 ) g P t .
T. 3. If ci 6 P,r, /3 6 Pjy< and ol, /3 translate as ci' , /3 1 • 
respectively, then ( d 7 /3 ) translate as
A'r/i -).7
In the following sentence which has an event reading,
the common noun inu can be interpreted as a dog or more
than one dog, depending on a context.
(79) Inu ga hasitteiru "A/Some dogs are running.” 
dog running
Since (79) requires existential quantification, it can be
considered to derive from an C-level predicate as
follows; ----  the consideration of tense and aspect is
excluded here.
(79) Inu-ga hasitteiru, t F0
inuTT^r ga-hasiru, IV^ ( R (2/ ^ 12-jJ
inu,c1SJ hasiruIV .   hasiru1
Here we notice that the descriptive jga functions 
as a predicate operator and hence it might be considered 
to be an Event predicate operator which maps a predicate 
into an event-level predicate. This process is a purely 
logical one, and the following rule can be formulated for it.
S.5. I f ^  6 PIV, F ^ Q ) 6 P IV, where F ^ d )  = £a-(ctJIV,
T.5. If d  translates as d  1 , F^(d*) translates as
A x  3 s A  ( 3 ' x )  X  (Sj J
50.
The problem in this analysis is that there is a 
discrepancy between logical syntax, which is based on truth 
conditions and linguistic syntax, which is based on phonology. 
Linguistic syntax predicts the following parsing in (78) 
and (79).
(78) /inu-wa/hasiru/
(79) /inu-ga/hasitteiru/
To fill the gap between logical syntax and linguistic syntax, 
it is necessary to postulate morphological rules which act 
on syntactic rules and yield the actual surface expression. 
Morphological rules can handle any linguistic regularity 
which relates to the phonological word or phrase. The 
following morphological rules which apply to the syntactic 
rule S.3 are formulated;
M.l. ( + S.3) If <di G and (3 has a Generic
IV-operator, FQ (d. /3 ) = dl -wa (?) 1
n
where the particle wa is attached to d  .
M.2. (+ S.3) If cX 6 PT , ,<3 6 P IV and has an Event
IV-operator, (d, Cd ) - cd -ga (i ,
v
where the particle jra is attached to •
This process might be called * subjectivization', 
because it creates a syntactic subject. Since this area 
concerns the interrelationships between phonology, 
morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, it should be 
one of great interest for linguists. For instance, Haraguchi 
(1977) in his autosegmental phonology of Japanese treats 
the subject marker £a as an enclitic, where the unaccented 
form of a word phonologically attaches to the preceding 
adjacent word. An enclitic is neither a true suffix 
nor an independent element. It has the external
characteristics of the suffix (or bound form) and the 
internal feeling of the word (or free form). (Cf. E.
SapTr;1930-31).
The general rule of the enclitic in Japanese is
given by Haraguchi as follows. The abstract accent marker
is represented as a star.
If a starless enclitic follows a starred word, the 
enclitic has an Low tone, and if it follows a 
starless word, it has a High tone.
Thus consider the following case*:
(80) a. yu
* 
k 1 "snow" yu
4i
ki-.ga
b. nu
mi zu
"dog”
"water"
nu-ga
mi zu-ga
Since this kind of tone rule can be added to morphological 
rules, this enclitic rule seems to support the attachment 
rules M.l. and M.2.
2.2. Japanese adjectives
This analysis of Japanese adjectives considerably 
diverges from that of the philosopher Sakai’s (1979) 
pioneering work on Japanese Montague grammar. Firstly 
Sakai (1979;64) defines a sentence as a linguistic 
expression which is true or false in a discourse context. 
Hence he regards all of the following examples as sentence
(81) Tanaka wa 1940 non 11 gatu 22 niti ni umareta
Tanaka year month day on born past
"Tanaka was born on 22nd November 1940. "
(82) Hana ga saiteiru 
flower blooming
"Flowers are blooming."
(83) Otoko ga onna o nagutteiru
men women beating "Men are beating women."
(84) Utukusii 
beautiful
(85) KagurU
beat
(86) Nagurareru
be beaten
and he takes both (84) and (83) as a basic atomic sentence 
But we should note that then t with his definition loses 
the recursiveness of natural languages. From a linguist's 
point of view, the subjects in (84), (85) and (86) are 
recoverable from the context, and considered to be 
contextually deleted. This is not a specific phenomenon 
to Japanese, for the following English examples acan have 
truth-values in some contexts.
(87) Beautiful
(88) Better had
(89) c *rti-ing.
As Montague explicitly points out in UG, we must make 
the distinction between a sentence type and a sentence 
token. A sentence type is an abstract entity which is 
independent of its use, while a sentence token is "an 
occurrence of a sentence type in a particular context of 
use." (Cf. P. Halvorsen and N. Ladusaws1979*212)• Truth 
is a property of sentence tokens not of sentence types. 
Therefore when utMkusii is used by itself as an expression 
in a certain context, it may have a truth-value but then 
it is not a sentence type but a sentence token. Thus,
(90) Hanako wa utukusii. "Hanako is beautiful."
beautiful
(90) can be regarded as an ordinary subject-predicate 
form and a sentence type, while utukusii is an intransitive 
verb which forms a sentence with a term. Moreover if 
utukusii is a sentence as Sakai says, it is difficult to 
understand why sentence adverbs such as kanarazusimo 
’’necessarily” can not be combined with this sentence. 
Therefore Sakai’s analysis will not be followed.
Secondly, Sakai claims that there is no distinction 
between adjectives and verbs in Japanese and treats both 
of them as declarative sentences. However, from a 
linguist's point of view, morphological and syntactic^ 
distinctions between adjectives and verbs can not be ignored, 
as was discussed in 2.0. Moreover, a non-extensional verb 
such as sagasu 'look for* does not behave like a non- 
extensional adjective ookii 'big*. Therefore T maintain 
the two distinct categories adjectives and verbs.
Adjectives of Chinese origin are excluded here.
Bjy = /basiru7v , /arukwTy 
run walk
B . . = AitukusijL*7i-.&<J j ^genkidjaTna-adjective 
beautiful *
Thirdly, the theory which relates to adjectives 
that Sakai adopts seems to be close to Siegel's (1976). 
Namely, he divides adjectives into extensional and 
intensional; for instance, (91) is acceptable but (92) is
not.
(91) Utukusiihito wa utukusii (extensional) 
beautiful person beautiful
”A beautiful person is beautiful.”
(92) ? Ookii nomi wa ookii (intensional)
"A big flea is big.”
m.
He then incorporate© a new variable into the intensional
adjectives as a parameter and derives prenominal
adjectives of both kinds by RII and RIII.
(93) RII Sentence S  ---■> adjective phrase
RIII Adj.phrase P + common noun phrase C ----■> common
noun phrase.
Where predicative adjectives are concerned, he treats 
extensional adjectives as sentences but translates
intensional adjectives into
(9't) ~i theiie^ ( ^adj .phrased (essential property cf theme) ) 
This analysis is based on the logical equivalence between 
the following sentences:
(9f) John is excellent.
(96) John is (an) excellent CN.
However, this theory of adjectives is not applicable to 
Japanese. Observe the following examples.
(97) Hanako wa utukusikatta
beautiful-past
11 Hanako was beautiful.”
(98) Hanako wa utukusikatta hito da
beautiful-past person
”Hanako is a person who was beautiful.”
Note that Japanese adjectives are tensed even in a 
prenominal position. (98) implies that Hanako is not 
beautiful at the moment of utterance, but not (97)- 
Therefore (98) is not logically equivalent to (97) and 
hence this theory of adjectives is untenable in Japanese.
In addition, Japanese does not seem to conform to 
Siegel’s doublets theory of adjectives at all. Siegel (1979)
claims that the following adjectival phrase is ambiguous
o
between intersective and subsective reading.
(99) Marya is a beautiful dancer.
In the subsective reading, Marya is a dancer who dances 
beautifully, although she might not be beautiful to look 
at, while in the intersective reading Marya is beautiful 
and she is a dancer. However, I am informed by native 
speakers of English that the intersective reading is 
possible only in a special context. To handle the 
ambiguity she finds in (99), Siegel proposes to classify 
most English adjectives as "doublets” which have both 
subsective and intersective reading. However, the Japanese 
adjective utukusii "beautiful” does not have subsective 
reading but only intersective reading. Observe the 
following example.
(100) Mariko wa utukusii odoriko da.
beautiful dancer is
"Mariko is a beautiful dancer.”
(100) simply means that Mariko is beautiful and that she
is a dancer. To have subsective reading, we must substitute 
migotona "beautiful” for utukusii as follows.
(101) Mariko wa migotona odoriko da.
"Mariko is a beautiful dancer.”
(101) can only mean that Mariko dances beautifully. This
suggests that Japanese does not require a "doublet” theory
of adjectives. Moreover, the intersective reading of the
English adjective "beautiful” can be considered to be due
Q
to a pragmatic influence.
The theory of adjectives I prefer is Kamp's (1975) 
predicate theory of degree adjectives. Japanese adjectives 
of Chinese origin which function as nouns should be excluded 
from here. Degree adjectives are adjectives which can be 
modified by degree modifiers such as very and fairly. The
predicate theory claims:
(i) Degree adjectives are predicated.
(ii) The interpretation of degree adjectives in
predicate position is context-dependent.
(iii) The interpretation of degree adjectives in
prenominal positions can be accounted for 
by context-dependency as predicates.
This theory is based on the observations that the
determination of truth-value of those examples crucially
depends on the context of use. This theoretically means
that semantics is not autonomous with pragmatics. Observe
the following examples.
(102) Mary is a remarkable pianist.
(103) John is a small man.
(10*») This is an old clock.
(102) could be true when it is uttered intending comparison
with amateur pianists but could be false when it is
uttered at the Festival Hall. (103) could be true in the
West but could be false in the East. (lO^ t) could be true
at home but could be false in antique shops.
This context-dependency of the interpretation of
degree adjectives was formulated by Kamp (1975) raodel-
theoretically and he says that
John is a small man is true in c^ if and only if 
John is small is true in that context c' where 
the comparison class10 for small is the set of men.
(Of. E.H.Klein;1977;51)
This proposal cannot easily be incorporated into the PTO
framework, because intensional logic cannot represent that
N is contextually relevant to A. Therefore adjectives will
be excluded from this fragment.
2.3* Japanese adverbs
(i) Sakai (1979) regards a verb like hasiru "run" as a 
sentence and hence a manner adverb yakkurito "slowly” is 
translated into the type ( (s,t), t). The following adverbs 
are included in his fragment:
kinoo "yesterday”, kippari "decidedly", utukusikq
"beautifully” , yukkurito "slowly", kineini "neatly" etc.
but we note that no sentence adverbs are included.
Since we treat a verb hasiru "run" as IV (intransitive 
verbs) we can distinguish predicate adverbs IV/IV from 
sentence adverbs t/t. Montague's semantic theory of 
adverbs was explicitly formulated by Thomason and Stalnaker 
(197*0 who stated that one of the convincing tests to 
distinguish predicate adverbs from sentence adverbs was to 
apply "It is Q-ly true that" for the sentence containing 
adverbs. For instance,
(105)a. Necessarily bachelors are unmarried.
b. It is necessarily true that bachelors are unmarried.
(106)a. John walks slowly.
*b. It is slowly true that John walks.
The unacceptability of (106b) suggests that slowly should 
not be a sentence adverb but a predicate adverb.
We will now apply this test to Japanese adverbs.
(107)a» Kanarazusirao 9 wa kisuu da 
necessarily 9 odd be
"Necessarily 9 is odd."
b. 9 kisuu dearu koto wa kanarazusimo hontoo da.
odd is that necessarily true be
"It is necessarily true that 9 is odd."
kanarazusiio "necessarily" must be a sentence adverb.
(108)a. Ainiku Taroo wa byooki da 
Unfortunately ill
"Unfortunately Taro is ill."
b. Taroo ga byooki dearu koto wa ainiku hontoo da.
ill that unfortunately true
"It is unfortunately true that Taroo is ill."
Ainiku "unfortunately" must be a sentence adverb.
(109)a. Sibasiba Taroo wa byookini naru
often ill become
"Taro often becomes ill."
*b. Taroo ga byookini naru koto wa sibasiba hontoo da
ill become often true
"It is often true that Taro becomes ill."
A frequency adverb sibasiba "often" must be a predicate adverb
(110)a. Taroo wa kasikokumo osuku kita
wisely late came
"Taro wisely came late."
*b. Taroo ga osoku kita koto wa kasikokumo hontoo da 
late came that wisely true
"It is wisely true that Taro came late."
A subject-oriented adverb kasikokumo "wisely" must 
be a predicate adverb.
(111)a. Taroo wa hakkirito kotaeta
clearly answered
"Taro answered clearly."
*b. Taroo ga kotaeta koto wa hakkirito hontoo da.
answered that clearly true
A manner adverb hakkirito "clearly" must be a predicate
adverb.
As in English, the negative sentences containing 
sentence adverbs imply the negative sentences without 
adverbs, and the negative sentences containing predicate 
adverbs imply the corresponding affirmative sentences 
without adverbs. However, some subject-oriented adverbs, 
which are semantically predicate adverbs, behave like 
sentence adverbs. Consider the following examples, where a
(112)a. Taroo wa kasikokumo yakusoku o wasurenakatta
wisely promise forget-not-past
’’Taro wisely did not forget a promise.” 
b. Taroo wa yakusoku o wasurenakatta.
"Taro did not forget a promise."
(113)a» Taroo wa wazato terebi o minakatta.
on purpose television watch-not-past
"Taro did not watch television on purpose."
b. Taroo wa terebi o minakatta.
"Taro did not watch television."
Therefore we assume that negation will apply before a
sentence adverb and a subject-oriented adverb are formed,
while negation will apply after a manner adverb is formed.
Three kinds of adverbs are roughly analyzed as
follows.
(114) Ainiku Taroo wa seikoo sinakatta.t "Unfortunately Taro
^ did not succeed."
Ainiku,t/t Taroo wa sejkoosinakatta. t (sentence adverb)
seikoosinax,Taroo, T
seikoosuru, ’IV/IV
(115) Taroo wa kasikokumo konakatta. F2 "Taro wisely did not
come"
(subject-oriented adverb)
Taroo, T kasikokumo konakatta.
kasikokumo konakattaIV/IV
IV F,
IV F.
kuru, nai IV/IV
"Taro does not speak 
slowly." 
(manner-adverb)
Taroo, T yukkurito hanasanai,TV
yukkurito hanaau
F5
s . nai , IV/TV
F5
yukkurito *IV/IV hanasu IV
Therefore, we need two kinds of rules of adverbs, S.6* 
and S.7* as follows:
2.^. Japanese quantifier-like particles
Some particles such as wa, mo, koso, sae, demo, sika, 
were called kakarijoai, "modifying particles", by the 
traditional grammarian Yamada, who analyzed these particles 
as attaching to the predicate and influencing it. Kuroda 
(1969) was the first to notice the quantifier-like 
character of these particles.
Kuroda gi\res the following logical form (117b) for (117a):
( 1 1 7 ) John wa s.s. sae yonda. "John read even s.s."
b . Y (J ohn ^  s .s. )
s.6. if ^ g fiv/iv’ fi b ? iv* ^  ^^  Piv
where F^( c)-, /3 ) = d /3
T.6 If l fi translates as d,/3 , F^Ccd, fi ) translates as
c i ' W
s.7 . If d  6  Pt/t’ /3 6 pt ’ f6 (c^ /3) &  pt ’
where (d, (i) * (d fi 
T.7. If d, /3 translates as <d, /3 , F^ Cid, /3 ) translates as
T.l. (b) Kanarazusimo translates as 
"necessarily"
Let us concentrate on the particle sae "even"
2 i» introduced to represent the quantifier-like element 
aae "even" and it is defined as:
(118) P (a, gb) = P(a,b) • ) ( / j X  f  b)-P(a,zY7 J
This means that "even" is semantically significant, but 
some recent research suggests that the connotation sae 
"even” conveys the conventional implication. Compare the 
sentence (119) with (117).
(119) John wa s.s, o yonda ’’John read s,s.”
Since (117) and (119) have the same truth conditions, the 
special connotation created by the insertion of sae 
should be handled at the level of pragmatics.
Here we will only consider the syntax and semantics 
of sae-sentences. Then the syntactic analysis proposed by 
Karttunen and Peters (1979) is applicable to sae. For 
instance f
(120) Taroo sae kita. t^ ’’Even Taro came.”
Taroo,T x ga^kita. tp2
X,T ga-*eita,IV
In (120), the focus of sae is ’’Taroo” and the scope of
sae is ”x ga kita.” The sae rule is essentially a rule
of quantification S.l4 in PTQ, and hence sae has no effect
on truth conditions.
First the rule of quantification will be formulated
and then the sae rule, and the contrastive wa rule.
S.8. If a. 6  PT and /36 Pt , then T - Q  Pt ,
where F^(^( /3) comes from /3 by replacing the first 
occurrence of a variable x by dl •
T.8. If ol / /3 translates as , Fy(^,3) translates as
ci' (it/j /&'J
5.9 . I t d 6  PT . and/^ 0 Pt , then FsaG(ci//3 ) ^ P t ,
where F (o^ ./3) comes from /3 by replacing the sae
first occurrence of a variable by ol sae
T.9. If oL /3 translates as oi7, /3 F (&. 3  ) translates as' sae '
£' (In 3')
Not all the kakarijosi can be handled as above, but the 
contrastive wa rule can be formulated in the same way as 
the sae rule.
5.10. If CZ 6 PT . and S3 6 Pt , Fw a (d,/3 ) ft P± ,
where F^-a(c)//3) comes from /3 by replacing the 
first occurrence of a variable by q( wa.
T.10. If d. fi translates as /3^  « F^a ( o), /3 ) translates
as a  ( 2, /3 ).
The anaphoric use of wa and exhaustive-listing ga are 
excluded from this fragment. To handle the anaphoric wa, 
we need to adopt a discourse model.
Footnotes
1. Sinnihonsiki Rornanization is used to transcribe 
Japanese examples.
2. This was pointed out to me by Hide Ishiguro in a 
personal coimiunication.
3. The principle of incompatibility asserts that at 
the time of change from p to q neither p nor q 
obtains.
This was pointed out to me by J.F. Buse in a personal 
communication.
5. The Japanese suffixal verb dasu seems to correspond 
to English verb start and h a j i m e m  to English verb
begin, but kakeru does not have any simple 
corresponding English verb.
6. This was pointed out to me by E.H. Klein during the 
LAGB Autumn meeting (19&0 ).
) denotes the application of the function 
to the intension of ft* .
8. Adjectives which denote an intersective function are 
called intersective, and the denotation of subsective 
adjectives is a function that assigns subproperties
to a property.
9. The comparison class is related to a ’topic of 
conversation'. It is a subset of the universe of 
discourse which the speakers and hearers pick up 
in relation to the conversation.
Chapter 3: Japanese complementation
3.0. Introduction
The notion of embedding or complementation has been 
introduced into Japanese linguistics by transformational 
grammarians. They not only regard some subordinate clauses 
as complements but also postulate complements in the deep 
structure and relate them to surface non-sentential 
elements by the applications of transformations.
This chapter re-examines the transformational 
mechanisms of complementation and attempts to propose a 
non-transformational analysis of Japanese complementation 
by applying Montague’s theory of grammar. Transformational 
grammarians rely heavily on semantic evidence in postulating 
deep structure. However, their semantics is undefined and 
it relies heavily on the native speaker’s rather vague 
intuition. It is hoped that Montague’s grammatical analysis, 
which is based on truth conditions, will be able to clarify 
the semantics of Japanese complementation, and simplify 
the syntax considerably.
Transformations are defined as the mapping between 
two full sentence structures but Montague grammar defines 
syntactic rules as the mapping between expressions of any 
syntactic category. It is an interesting problem whether or 
not a grammar without transformations can be adequate.
3.1. The Japanese sentential nominalizer no
According to Nakau (1973)» who has made an exhaustive 
study into the transformational syntax of Japanese 
complementation, there are three kinds of sentential 
nominalizers no, koto, and tokoro in Japanese. Matrix verbs
can be subcategorized according to which of the sentential 
nominalizers appear in the object complement. For 
instance, factive verbs can take either no or koto at the 
end of the object complement but verbs such as those of 
learning, ordering and proposing only require koto. The 
sentential nominalizer no is required not only by verbs 
of perception, which can also take tokoro, but also by 
verbs of stopping, helping, meeting and waiting.
Many traditional grammarians of the Japanese language 
regarded sentential nominalizers as syncategorematic, i.e., 
having no substantial meaning but just a grammatical 
function as a place-holder. It was Kuno (1973) who first 
pointed out a meaning difference between the sentential 
nominalizers koto and no. He says: "No represents a concrete 
action, state, or event directly perceived by any of five 
(or six) senses, while koto represents a more abstract 
concept.... One can see or hear a concrete event, but not 
an abstract concept." His insight is admirable, but it is 
regrettable that he did not provide a precise definition 
of "event" nor any direct formalism. Moreover, contrary 
to his prediction about n o , the following complements do 
not represent an event directly perceived
(1) Taroo wa /hitoride kangaeru/g no o yameta 
Taro alone thinking nom. stopped
"Taro stopped thinking alone."
(2) Taroo wa /Hanako ga keikaku o tateru/ no o tetudattammm mam gj
Taro Hanako plan make nom. helped
"Taro helped Hanako make a plan."
(3) Taroo wa /Hanako ga akirameru/ no o matteirummm mmm g
Taro Hanako giving up nom. waiting for
"Taro is waiting for Hanako to give up."
These verbs of* thinking, planning and giving up are
verbs of mental events which cannot be directly perceived,
but we must add that they are still referring to an event
of an event•
or some temporal segments/ I define an event as a change 
from a state p to a state q which is distinguishable from 
p. For example consider the sentence "It is raining” ; in 
this event there is clearly a start, before which it is 
not raining.
Now let us concentrate for a while on Japanese verbs
of perception and attempt to provide an explicit semantics
for them by applying Carlson's version of Montague grammar.
Carlson (1978) points out that the ambiguity which is found
in "Bill ran" can be accounted for by distinguishing an
event-level predicate "run" (stage-level predicate in
Carlson's term) from a kind-level predicate "run". Event-
level predicates refer to an event or some temporal
segments of events, but kind-level predicates describe a
generic property of an object. Carlson's event-level
predicates are directly perceived.
Observe the following examples of verbs of perception.
(^)a. Taroo wa /^Hanako ga aruiteiru/^ no o mita 
Taro Hanako "walking" nom. saw
"Taro saw Hanako walking."
b.* Taroo wa /^Hanako ga kasikoi7 no o mita
intelligent
c.* Taroo wa ^/Hanako ga bi jin d$ari/g no o mita
to be a beauty
d.* Taroo wa j/Hanako ga soozoo.s«tu7_ no o mita
to have imagination
This shows that verbs of perception cannot operate on 
kasikoi "intelligent", bijin dearu "be a beauty" and soozoo
suru "imagine1’. We note that being intelligent and being
a beauty are not events but states of affairs, but
imagining is a mental event which cannot be directly
perceived. Therefore, we conclude that verbs of perception
operate on events except mental events. Verbs of meeting
do not operate on mental events, either.
Next let us consider the verb "stopping" examples
of which are given below.
(5)a. Taroo wa £osieru^' no o yameta
Taro teaching nom. stopped
"Taro stopped teaching."
b.* Taroo wa /kasikoi7 no o yameta
wise stopped
c. Taroo wa /_soozoosuru7a no o yameta
imagine 
"Taro stopped imagining."
d. Taroo wa /kangaeru/ no o yameta
think S
"Taro stopped thinking."
This shows that the verb of stopping cannot operate on 
the state of affairs of being intelligent but can act 
on the state of affairs of verbs of mental events such as 
imagining and thinking. Since verbs of helping and waiting 
behave like verbs of stopping, we conclude that verbs 
which require the sentential nominalizer no operate on 
event-level predicates which refer to an event or some 
temporal segments of an event. Most of these verbs refer 
to the ongoing part of an event, but the verb of helping 
can refer to the whole event. The fact that the verbs of 
perception reject verbs of mental event needs to be 
explained separately.
We have more supporting evidence for the above 
conclusion. For instance, generic sentences cannot be 
embedded into sentences whose matrix verbs require the 
sentential nominalizer no. Observe the following sentence
(6)* Taroo wa /kujira ga honyuudoobutu dearii/^ no o mita. 
Taro whale mammal be nom. saw
*"Taro saw whales mammals."
Note that when generic sentences are embedded, the generic 
particle wa is regularly changed into jga. Moreover, in 
the following sentence, the embedded sentence can have an
event reading only.
(7) Taroo wa inu ga hoeru no o kiita.
Taro dog bark nom, heard.
"Taro heard dogs bark."
To analyze the syntax of the sentences which take 
the verbs of perception, let us convert them into the 
passive. Then we notice that the complement s no cannot 
be passivized as a whole but the complement subject can 
become a subject of the passive sentence. For instance, 
(8a) cannot be converted into (8b) but forms (8c).
(8)a. Taroo wa Hanako ga aruiteiru no o mita.
Taro Hanako walking nom. saw.
"Taro saw Hanako walking."
*b. Hanako ga aruiteiru no ga Taroo niyotte mirareta
Hanako walking Taro by was seen
"Hanako's walking was seen by Taro."
c. Hanako wa aruiteiru no o Taroo niyotte mirareta.
Hanako walking nom. Taro by was seen.
"Hanako was seen walking by Taro."
This suggests that the complement s should not be the 
object complement but Hanako should be the object. Thus 
we analyze the following sentence as follows.
(9) Taroo gaj^anako ga aruku no o mita. t
ga-Hanako ga aruku no o miru. IV
Hanako ga aruku no o miru. TV
ga-aruku,IV, no-o-miru
9
•TV/XV f8
aruku ’IV o-rairu ’TV
Note that the operation from aruku IV to ga-aruku IV* was 
formulated in chapter 2, and was suggested to be an 
Event predicate operator. Here verbs of perception which 
take a sentential nominalizer no are categorized as TV/IV 
in contrast to transitive verbs of perception TV. Then 
there is a systematic category-changing relation between 
no-o-miru and o-mlru.and hence a lexical rule which 
changes TV into TV/IV is proposed. Lexical rules, which 
were first suggested by Dowty (1978a) for Montague grammar 
differ from syntactic rules. They do not contribute to 
the compositional semantics but they relate two basic 
expressions belonging to two different categories. They 
do not operate on a whole sentence but on an individual 
category, and replace lexically governed transformations. 
The following lexical rule is formulated for the verb miru
L.ll. If a  6 PT V , F8 W ) e P TV/IT. where F g U )  » n o • 
T.ll. If oL translates as ' i Fo(^i) translates as
k Q ^ ?  P ( y ^ s3u(R  < w. I')* R ( U ,
o)  Q(L i))
(Of. G. Carlson:1978:126)
Now we can translate sentence (9) as follows:
( 10) /R(u/,Taroo)$ R(^» Hanako)^ miru * ( tf/ , U)
aruku' (1/07
There are more elaborate formal approaches developed by 
Usberti (1977) and Barwise (1980). For the sake of 
simplicity, we will exclude the more detailed analysis of 
verbs of perception and maintain the above simple semantics 
for verbs of perception.
What is peculiar from the point of view of linguists 
is the sequence o-miru and no-o-miru. We have deliberately 
chosen this parsing, because choice between an object 
marker o^ and a sentential nominalizer no depends on the 
verb. Phonologically they are enclitic. The enclitic
rule will work for the sequence of the complement verb and 
no-o.
The following two rules are necessary to generate 
sentence (9).
S. 12. Ifdl £ PTV/IV and &  £ P iv» then ft) 6 PT y ,
where F9 (^,r3) = fjftd _7Ty
T.12. I f £ PTV'IV and ^ 3 6 P iv 5111(1 translates as df, &
respectively, then F„ (oi fi) translates as ('^ R> )
J '
S.13. I f J  £ PTV and ft> £ PT , then F 10(d./3) £ P JV.
where ? 1Q( d , (b ) = /73c
T.13. If d  6 PTV and (2> £  PT , and translates as d;/3x
respectively, then F^0 (c3\ fi ) translates as df fi d
Thus I conclude that the verbs which take the 
sentential nominalizer no operate on event expressions, but 
no behaves as a predicate operator in this semantics. The 
event is defined as a change from a state p to a state q 
which is distinguishable from p. This definition does not 
distinguish between mental and physical events. However, 
the verbs of perception which take the sentential
nominalizer no do not act on expressions of* mental events* 
Therefore only the verbs of perception can be analyzed 
by using Carlson’s event-level predicates*
3*2* Japanese subject raising
In transformational literature, two kinds of 
subject raising are discussed, that is, subject to subject 
raising and subject to object raising* Inoue (1978;32) 
claims that there is no subject to subject raising in • 
Japanese, by quoting the following English examples and 
comparing them with the corresponding Japanese translations.
(10)a. For my brother to be involved in this incident 
is most unlikely*
 _  ^ Subject to subject raising
b* My brother is most unlikely to be involved 
in this incident*
(11) Watasi no kyoodai ga jiken ni maki komareteiru
my brother incident involved
Kanoosei wa mattaku nai* 
possibility at all not
"For my brother to be involved in this incident 
is most unlikely."
Inoue points out that the Japanese example (11) does not
have the corresponding subject to subject raising version*
However, Nakau (1973) claims that subject to subject
raising (in his terms "complement subject raising") is
necessary for the class of predicates such as rasii
"likely", kamosirenai "might" (epistemic), nitigair>ai
"must" (epistemic)* He assumes that this class of predicates
have the following subjectless deep structure and hence
require subject to subject raising. Note that the complement
predicate is tensed.
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(12) Taroo ga kita rasii
Taro came likely "It is likely Taro came."
s
PredPNP Aux
Preds
Taroo ga Hita
Tns
rasi-
i
Analysis using Montague's grammar does not have any 
postulate such as subjectless deep structure but analyses 
rasii in terms of a sentence operator. Since other items 
such as kamasirenai "might" and nitigainai "must" are 
modal sentence operators, we can generalize Nakau's 
complement subject raising as the process of combining a 
sentence with a sentence operator. Thus there is no 
need of subject to subject raising in Japanese. Therefore 
example (12) can be analyzed as follows in Montague grammar.
(13) Taroo ga kita rasii. "It is likely Taro came."
Translation of (13) : rasii' (A \  PVP( t ) (^kita' ) )
Since the rule of sentence adverb has already been 
formulated in Chapter 2, S.7» and it can be used in this 
example, it is not necessary to formulate a new rule, 
although the following special translation rule must be 
added to Japanese formal language -
T.l. (c) kamos ,‘renai "might" translates as 'p*“7 Q  C
Taroo ga kita,^ rasii,
(cf. M. Bennett:197^;131)•
Another topic of controversy has been that of 
subject to object raising with two of the main 
protagonists being Chomsky (1973) and Postal (1974).
Kuno (1976) in his analysis of Japanese subject-raising 
found evidence to support Postal's viewpoint that this 
was a syntactic device. Namely Kuno claimed that
(l4a) derived from (14b) by the application of subject 
to object raising.
(14)a. Taroo va Hanako c> bakada to omotteita.
Taro Hanako stupid thought.
"Taro thought Hanako to be stupid."
b. Taroo wa Hanako j^ a bakada to omotteita.
"Taro thought that Hanako was stupid."
However, in contrast with English subject raising,
Japanese subject raising is lexically limited to verbs
of thinking and feeling (Cf. S.Kuno;1976;43) and it is
to be noted that there is no need of de-finitization.
Although Postal (1974) formulates raising in terms of
a grammatical relation such as
(15) Promote the subject of a complement and 
de-finitize the complement
whether or not this rule has a universal status is dubious.
From the point of view of Montague grammar, it is
necessary to pay attention to the fact that Japanese
subject raising is very much lexically governed. Moreover,
there is a systematic semantic relation between
proposition-taking raising verbs and IV-taking raising
verbs, which has been called "semantic lowering" by
Thomason (1976). These facts can be captured by using
Dowty's lexical rule as follows.
L.l**. If a  6  PIV/t» then F^Cc^) 6 P,TV/IV
T.l**. If c^ . translates as a** then F^C ^ )  translates as
Note that is a variable of type s, f(T)> , which
denotes properties of properties of individuals and P 
is a variable C s,f(IV)> , which denotes a set of 
individuals.
Then (l*ta) will be analyzed as follows.
(16) Taroo wa Hanako o bakada to omotteieu .t F^
3*3. Japanese verb raising
Like other aggulutinative languages, Japanese 
makes extensive use of derivational suffixation which 
has the effect of producing complex predicate expressions. 
Some are exemplified in the following sentences.
a  p x  j 5 a  pi V  (z)j
(Cf. D. Dowty:1978a;416)
"Taro thinks Hanako to 
be stupid 1'
Taroo, T Ilanako o bakada to o m o t t e i r u . p ,
10
Hanako T
bakada to omotteiru. TV.F
9
bakada, IV to omotteiru ’TV/IV F
to omotteiru. IV/t
omotteiru' ( A /^Xp^p(h) ) bakadaJ__/) ( X P ^ P  (t) )
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(17)a« Taroo wa nihongo ga hanaseru.
Taro Japanese speak-can
"Taro can speak Japanese."
b. Boku wa sake ga nomitai.
I sake drink-want
"I want to drink sake."
Cm Hanako wa hon o yomitagaru 
Hanako book read-vant
"Hanako wants to read a book."
d. Taroo wa ar Uj kidasi ta 
Taro walk-started
"Taro smarted walking."
e. Ziroo wa nakihajimeta 
Ziro cry began
"Ziro began to cry."
f. Hanako wa hon o yomioeta 
Hanako book read-finished
"Hanako finished reading a book."
g. Ziroo wa e o kakituzaketa 
Ziro picture draw-continued
"Ziro kept drawing a picture."
h. Taroo wa aine ni hurareta
Taro rain fall-passive-past
"It rained on Taro."
i. Taroo wa Hanako o hatarakaseta 
Taro Hanako worlc-cause-past
"Taro made Hanako work."
Transformational grammarians consider that these 
expressions derive from the complex deep structure 
through verb raising. This transformation raises the 
tenseless verb of the embedded sentence up to the left 
of the next higher verb by way of the Chomsky-adjunction. 
This can be illustrated as follows.
Y77.
(18)a.
NP NP
VV,2 1
tai
S VNP 1
NP V,2 2
tai
desiderative
r e ­
read
One of the problems in verb raising is that it 
requires a tenseless verb. Since the tense is the 
obligatory part of embedded sentences, Kuno (1973;333) 
proposed Aux Deletion which is a transformation that 
deletes the tense auxiliary in the embedded sentence.
Its application is obligatory before verb raising in
the second cycle of the following derivation (cf. S. Kuno;
1973:336).
(19) Boku ga hon ga yomitai. ”1 want to read a book.”
a. Deep structure: Boku /^boku hon yo»-ru7 ta-i
I I book read want
b. First cycle;
(i) Subject Marking: Boku /boku ga hon yom-ru7gta-i
(ii) Object Marking: Boku /boku ga hon o yom-ru7 ta-i
—  — — - 8
c. Second cycle;
(i) Equi-NP Deletion: Boku /0 hon o yom-ru/ ta-i-11 s
(ii) Aux Deletion: Boku /hon o yorn- 07 ta-i
(iii) Verb raising: Boku hon o yom-ta-i
(iv) Subject Marking: Boku ga hon o yom-ta-i
(v) Object Marking: Boku ga hon o ga yom-ta-i 
(vi) Ga/O Deletion: Boku ga hon 0 ga yom-ta-i
On the other hand, in Montague grammar, if we 
follow Partee's (1979) well-formedness conditions which 
attempt to maintain the spirit of Montague's direct 
decomposition, obligatory syntactic rules are not allowed 
and hence both Aux Deletion and Verb raising will be 
avoided. Then the VP yomitai "want to read" can be analyzed 
in Montague Grammar as the concatenation of the gerundive 
form of yomu and the desiderative morpheme tai. Most of 
the verb raising morphemes should belong to the category 
of IV/IV, which is the same as predicate adverbs. However, 
they differ from predicate adverbs syntactically, that is, 
they follow IV phrases in Japanese. Since Montague 
regards the categories A/B and A//B as "playing the same 
semantical but different syntactic roles," (Cf• R. Montague: 
197^:2^9) we make use of his new device of A//B and 
classify verb raising morphemes as belonging to the 
category IV//IV. Thus the sequences such as aruki-dasi- 
hajimeru "begin to start walking" and aruki-tuzuke-tai 
"want to continue walking" are analyzed as the concatenation 
of IV/IV//IV. IV//IV. Note that there must be an 
ordering constraint between these morphemes because this 
combination is not a free-order. Observe the following 
analysis tree.
(20) Hanako wa j^rukidasihajimeta. "Hanako began to
^ F2 start walking."
H a n a k o a r u k i d a s i h a j i m e r u .
arukidasi,iy^yiy hajimeru.Ty//iy
F12
aruki,IV dasi,IV//IV
Translation of (20J: \ p vP(h) (A ha jimeru V* das i (^aruki ^ )) ) 
Then the following rule is formulated;
s.15. if^6PIV//IV and/3 6 PIV, f12(^./3)6 piv,
where F^Cd*. /3) * IV*
T.15. If 0 PIV///IV. and/J £ PjV' and translates as ^  
respectively, then F translates as
Next let us concentrate on the desiderative 
morpheme /tai /. When it is oreceded by a transitive verb, 
the object marker _o can be changed into j?a, without changing 
meaning. Note /tai / requires the first person subject in 
the reportive style, although the third person subject can 
be taken in the non-reportive style. Observe the following 
examples.
(21)a. Watasi wa hon 
I book
ol yomitai. 
gaj read-want
"I want to read a book."
b. V.Tatasi wa mizu ( ol nomitai.
X water (£a J drink-want
"I want to drink water."
c. V/atasi wa Hanakof ni aitai.
I Hanako I / meet-want
d. Watasi wa isha j ni 
I doctor I ®a.
"I want to meet Hanako."
. naritai.
become-want
"I want to become a doctor.
e. Watasi wa sora j ol tobitai
I sky I ®a) fly-want
"I want to fly in the sky,”
f. Watasi wa reizooko j ol tabernono de ippai ni sitai
I refrigerator \ J food with full want
"I want to fill the refrigerator with food.”
g. Watasi wa hon J o) gakkoo e motteikitai.
I book ' ' school take-want
"I want to take books to school."
h. Watasi wa Taroo j ol isha ni sitai
I Taro ®aJ doctor make-want
f,I want to make Taro a doctor.”
According to Kuno's transformational analysis of case-marking,
object marking j^ a applies in the late stage of derivation
when the verb is stative. This is already illustrated in
(19) as follows:
(iv) Boku ga hon o yom-ta-i
I book read-want
■ ■ " > Object marking
(v) Boku ga hon o ga yom-ta-i
However, this transformational case-marking cannot explain 
why object-marking £a does not apply to (20f), (20g) and (20h).
We note that what is common to examples (20c),
(20d), (20e), (20f), (20g), (20h), which do not undergo
object-marking with j^ a, is that the verbs which precede 
/tai/ are not passivizable. This indicates that a sort 
of passivization is possible in the formation of ga...tai.
Thus examples (20a) and (20b) can be analyzed by adding a 
rule which includes a sort of passivization to the simple 
concatenation of the category IV and IV//IV. Observe the 
following analysis tree.
(22) Watasi wa seisho ga yomitai.^
I Bible read-want ”1 want to read the Bible.
seisho ga yomitai,IV
tai. IV//IV
Translation of (22): X  P^P ( ) ( ^  tai ( yomi*( AP^P(s)))
Here TVP stands for a transitive verb phrase which can 
undergo pure passivization. This is a syntactically defined 
phrasal category which was first suggested by Bach (19&0). 
However, it seems to be difficult to concatenate TVP 
with IV//IV and hence the above analysis is untenable.
Chapter k: Japanese Reflexive, Passive,
Causative Construction
4.0. Introduction
This chapter is an attempt to analyze Japanese 
reflexives, passives, and causatives by applying Montague's 
theory of grammar. The reflexive coreference condition 
which includes the notion of an experience^ is proposed for 
Japanese reflexivization. However, since Montague grammar 
cannot handle the notion of an experiencer, this condition 
is not applicable to Montague grairanar. Concerning direct
passives, a lexical rule is adopted. However, this approach 
cannot handle the scope ambiguity of attitudinal adverbs. 
Concerning o-causatives, neither a lexical rule nor a 
syntactic rule is adopted, but a lexical syntactic operation 
is proposed. This approach requires the o-ni rule, which is 
considered to correspond to the surface structure constraint. 
This chapter reveals limitations in PTQ grammar.
4.1 Japanese reflexivization
4.1.1. The study of Japanese reflexivization has been largely 
ignored by traditional grammarians, and it was left to 
transformational grammarians to discover a number of 
interesting facts about Japaese reflexivization. Let us 
first consider the properties of the reflexive zibun.
(i ) Zibun is used for all persons, genders and numbers.
Compare the Japanese sentences (la) (2a) and (3a ) with 
the corresponding English sentences (lb) (2b) and (3h).
(1)a. Watasi wa zibun o semeta.
I self blamed
b. I blamed myself.
(2)a. Taroo wa zibun o semeta.
Taro self blamed.
b. Taro blamed himself.
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(3)a. Otokotati wa zibun o semeta.*
men self blamed
b. The men blamed themselves.
(ii) The antecedent of the reflexive must be human:
(the humanness condition)
(4)* Ryuukoo wa zibun o kurikaesu.
fashion self repeat.
"Fashion repeats itself."
Instead of (4), Japanese normally put this into a passive 
form as follows:
(5) Hyuukoo wa kurikaesareru
fashion repeat-passive
"Fashion is repeated."
(iii) The antecedent of the reflexive must be the subject 
of the sentence (subject-antecedent condition)
(6) Taroo wa Ziroo ni zibun no koto o hanasita
Taro. Jiro self's matter told.
i  »
(7) "Taro^ told Jiro^ about himselfv*,
The antecedent of himself in Engl,if) sentence (7) could be 
either Taro or Jiro, whereas in the Japanese sentence (6) 
zibun refers unambiguously to the subject of the sentence, Taro.
Zibun does not have to be a ciausemate of its 
antecedent. In the following examples, zibun 
is coreferential with the matrix subject.
(8) Taroo wa /zibun ga yasumitai tokini^/ yasUmu.
Taro.. self^ rest-want when rest
"Taro takes a rest, when self^ wants."
(9) Hanako wa /zibun ga unda/£ kodomo o kawaigaru.
Hanako^ self^ gave birth child love
"Hanako. loves the child whom self, gave birth to." x 1 °
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(v) Zibun must be commanded by its antecedent
11 2 
(the command condition)
In (10a) zibun is commanded by Hanako and coreferential
with it, while in (10b) the command condition is not met,
if we interpret zibun as coreferential with Hanako.
(10)a. Zibun ga ima sundeiru ie o Hanako wa uritagatteiru
self^ now living house* Hanako^ sell-show a sign of
"Hanako^ shows signs of selling the house where 
self^ is living now.’1
(10)b. ♦Hanako^ ga ima sundeiru ie o zibun  ^ wa uritagatteiru
now living house self sell-show a
sign of
"Self^ shows signs of selling the house where 
Hanako is living now.”
^•1.2. Transformational grammarians first assumed a 
transformational derivation of the reflexives under the 
above conditions and especially the subject-antecedent 
condition was used to justify the complex deep structure.
For instance, Kuno (1973•303-^) postulates a complex deep 
structure for the indirect (or adversity) passive because 
of the ambiguity when zibun is included within it. Observe 
the following examples.
(11) Taroo wa Hanako ni zibun no uti de sinareta
TarO| Hanako^ by self's^ house at die-passive-past
"Taro. was affected by Hanako’s . death at self^.. house." 
i J ij
(12) Taroo wa Hanako ni zibun no jikka e kaerareta
Taro. Hanako. self's. , family house return-passive-past
i J i J
"Taro^ was affected by Hanako^s returning to self’s ^  
family house."
Here zibun can be coreferential with the subject of the 
sentence or non-subject element. Kuno explains this ambiguity 
by postulating the following two complex deep structures for 
(11).
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(13)a. Taroo ga /Hanako ga Taroo no uti-de sinu7 rare-ta,s
Taro's house at die passive-past
b. Taroo ga /!Ianako ga Hanako no uti de sinu/^ rare-ta.
Hanako's house at die passive-past.
Similarly, causative constructions yield an ambiguity with
zibun. In the following example, zibun can be coreferential
either with the subject of the sentence or with the causee.
(14) Taroo, wa Hanako. ni zibun,. o hihansaseta.i J i j
Taro.. Hanako^ self^j criticize-cause-past
"Taro^ made (or let) Hanako^ criticize self^.
As above, a similar deep structure that has Hanako as the 
subject of the embedded sentence can be assigned to (lk) 
as follows;
a. Taroo ga _/Hanako ga Taroo o hihansuruj sase-ta
criticize cause-past
b. Taroo ga ^/Hanako ga Hanako o hihansuru/ sase-ta
criticize cause-past
Then it was discovered that this purely syntactic 
approach was not sufficient to deal with all examples of 
Japanese reflexivization. N.McCawley (1976) suggested the 
necessity of lexical decomposition to account for backward 
reflexivization. Observe the following example given by 
N. McCawley, where the antecedent of the reflexive is not 
a subject but an object.
(15) / z;ibun ga gan de nakatta/. koto ga Ilirosi o yorokobaseta.
selfi cancer not-past that Hirosi^ please-past.
"That self‘s did not have cancer pleased Hirosi^."
N. McCawley argues that the object of sentence (15) must be 
a perceiver or experiencer of events, so that these emotive 
verbs should be decomposable into the abstract verb 
EXPERIENCE/PERCEIVE. She posits the following deep structure 
for (15).
S7.
(16)
NPNP
CAUSES
Hirosi ga yorokondaNPNP
EXPERIENCE/
PERCEIVE
Hirosi
Hirosi ga gan de nakatt?
Being inspired by Kuroda’s (1973®) work on reflexivization, 
which requires the consideration of style, Kuno (1972) 
claimed that the awareness of the referent of the reflexive 
about the state or action represented by the constituent 
sentence is responsible for the difference of grammaticality. 
He explains that in the example which led N. McCawley to 
propose lexical decomposition, the complement clause
represents the experiencer’s direct internal feeling, 
although counter-examples are given to the awareness theory 
of the referent of the reflexive by Kuroda (1973b). There 
is, however, general agreement on the matter of the antecedent 
of the reflexive in the above sentence as the experiencer 
of an event.
As a result, Inoue (1976a) proposed a number of 
post-cyclic interpretive rules for Japanese reflexivisation. 
The reflexive zibun is treated as a sub-class of nouns and 
generated in the base. Her interpretive rules (1976a:l6l) 
can account for most examples, but they are very complex.
For instance, they include the additional condition that the 
head noun is coreferential with zibun to account for
reflexivization in relative clauses as well as the notion 
of / - Like Subj/ to account for the ambiguity of reflexives 
in causative constructions such as (14). Her interpretive 
rules all apply to the surface (or shallow) structure, 
because they are based on automous syntax.
4.1.3. There are two approaches to reflexivization in 
Montague grammar, one by Montague, who suggested incorporating 
reflexivization into the rule of quantification which was 
later achieved by Bennett (1976), the other by Thomason 
(1976), who incorporates reflexivization into the rule of 
subject and predicate. Since Japanese ha3 the subject- 
antecedent condition, Thomason’s theory works for Japanese 
reflexivization to a certain extent. However, it cannot 
account for reflexivization that crosses a sentence boundary, 
for instance, sentences (8) (9) and (15). Moreover, since 
Partee’s (1979) well-formedness constraints prohibit us 
from incorporating abstract verbs into Montague syntax, 
we can not adopt N. McCawley*s device of lexical 
decomposition. Thus we will not incorporate reflexivization 
into the rule of subject and predicate.
It was pointed out by Inoue (1976bII:215) that 
there are some examples which do not satisfy the subject- 
antecedent condition. Observe her examples.
(17) Taroo wa Ziroo^ ni zibun^ no sippai o satoraseta
Taro Jiro self’s failure realize-cause-past
’’Taro made Jiro^ realize his own. failure.”
(18) Taroo wa Ziroo^ni zibun^-no sigoto o tanosimaseta.
Taro Jiro self’s work enjoy-cause-past
"Taro made Jiro^ enjoy his own^ work.”
khat is more interest ding is this: if we change sentence (18) 
into (19), where the subject Taro is an experiencer, an 
ambiguous interpretation of zibun is possible,
(19) Taroo^ wa ukkarisite Ziroo, ni zibun ... no sippai o 
Taro^ carelessly Jiro. self’s failure
satorasetesimat .ta. 
realize-cause-modal-past,
"Taro^ made Jiro^ realize his own.  ^ failure carelessly,
which should not have happened• "
This suggests that whether the antecedent is an experiencer 
or not is as important as the subject-antecedent condition.
Experiencer is a semantic notion whose referent 
unintentionally experiences events or emotions, and is 
underlined in the following sentences.
(20)a. Taroo wa jisin ni Kiga tuita 
Taro earthquake noticed.
"Taro noticed an earthquake."
b. Hanako wa ataraa ga itai 
Hanako head painful
"Hanako has a headache,"
c. Taroo wa Ziroo o sinaseta
Taro Jiro die-cause-past.
"Taro let Jiro die."
d. Hanako wa zibun no tosi o wasuretesi matta
Hanako self age forget-modal-past
"Hanako has forgotten her own age, which should 
not have happened."
Model-theoretically, experiencer is not different from
the agentive case. One of the weak noints of Montague
grammar is that it cannot distinguish agentive from non-
agentive. (This was independently pointed out by N.Ostler
(1980a).) However, the notion of experiencer must be
marked in Japanese grammar. According to J.E.Buse (personal
communication), there are some languages which mark
experiencers morphologically or grammatically.
Now to stay within the framework of Montague grammar,
it is possible to treat zibun as a pronoun and postulate
a reflexive coreference condition to account for the
coreference of the reflexive. Let us first consider the
reflexive zibun^ as belonging to a phrase of the category
term. Pronouns such as watasi "I" or kare "he” also belong
to this category. Thus we must add the following special
translation rule to Japanese formal language.
T.(l)d. Zibun , watasi , kare translates as A P VP (3^).■ ■■■■■■ n ■■■ - n — — n n
The referents in the indexical use of pronouns are specified
in Montague grammar with respect to the context of use.
Namely "He walks” could correspond to the proposition "John
walks" in one context of use, but in another context of use
it could correspond to the proposition "Taro walks." Instead
of the context of use, the referent of zibun can be
■.. -n
considered to be specified with respect to the following
condition:-
(21) The terra phrase controls reflexivization in IV or S, 
if and only if it is an experiencer or the highest 
human subject.
However, this condition cannot be incorporated into Montague 
grammar, which cannot handle the notion of an experiencer.
In spite of this fact, this condition can handle the 
coreference of Japanese reflexivization which poses a 
serious difficulty for any syntactic approach.
(22) Taroo wa zibun ga yasumitai toki ni yasum tj .
Taro. self. rest-want when rest,l x
"Taro^ takes a rest when self^ wants to."
Taroo is a highest human subject in S.
t
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(23) Taroo wa Ziroo^ ni zibun^ no sippai o satoraseta
Taro Jiro self’s failure realize-cause-past
"Taro made Jiro^ realize his own.^ failure.”
As Inoue (1976a:129) points out, some native speakers
allow ambiguous readiness in (23)$ but they prefer the
above reading. This suggests that this reading is much
stronger than the other possible reading.
Ziroo is an experiencer and Taroo is a human subject.
If we add simatta (modal) to (23), both Taro and Jiro
are experiencer?. Then ambiguity arises as follows.
(2k) Taroo wa Ziroo ni zibun no sippai o satorasetesiraatta
Taro. Jiro. self's-- failure realize-cause-raodal-pas
* J J
"Taro^ made Jiro^ realize his own. . failure, which
should not have happened.”
(25) Sono keiken wa Mary ni zibun ga bakadearu koto o osieta.
The experience Mary. self^ fool is that taught.
"The experience taught Mary^ that self^ is a fool.”
(Cf. S. Kuno:1972 (117a))
Mary is an experiencer, but sono keiken is not a human subject.
(26) Mary ga zibun o hinan sita koto ga John o utinomesita
Mary self^ accused that John. beat up-past
"That Mary accused self., bowled John^ over.”
Y.e can simply explain this coreference by regarding John 
as an experiencer.
Moreover, where reflexives in relative clauses are 
concerned, the following additional condition is suggested 
by Inoue's surface interpretive rules is unnecessary.
(27) The human head noun can control reflexivization 
in relative clauses.
Unlike surface interpretive rules, the reflexive coreference
condition should be applicable in the process of derivation.
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and hence the subject-antecedent condition is sufficient
to handle reflexivization in relative clauses.
(28) Taroo wa zibun no namae o wasuretesimatta
Taro^ self's^ name forget-completive-past
tomodati o tazuneta 
friend visit-past
"TarOj visited a friend^ who had forgotten his^^ name.”
Taroo wa zibun no namae o wasuretesimatta tomodat \ . o tazuneta,
Taroo^ zibun no namae o wasurete_simatta tomodat1 tazuneru^
zibun no namae o wasuretesi matta tomodati o^ tazuneru^y
zibun no namae o wasuretsimatta tomodati CN
x ga zibun no namae o o n wasuretesimatta. tomodatit CN
Variable binding and deletion of relative clauses take
place between X and the head noun tomodati, so that zibun ‘ o  —   *  n
is not bounded in the earliest stage. If the reflexive
coreference condition applies before relative clause formation,
zibun is coreferential with the subject X , that is, tomodati. ——. — — n o " 1
If the reflexive coreference condition applies at a later 
stage, zibun is coreferential with the subject Taroo.
Next let us consider the following example of the 
relative clause, where zibun is only coreferential with 
the head noun.
(29) Taroo wa zibun no oya ga sindesimatta kodomotati o atumeta
Taro self's parents die-completive children^ gather
past
"Taro gathered children whose parents had died.”
Taroo m " ’ irnatta kodomotati o atumeru,t
: ibun no oya ga sindeslmatta is a sentence, and except for 
zibun this sentence does not include a variable which
should be bounded and deleted by a relative clause formation.
Thus zibun_, which is a free variable, will be bounded by  ..   ■ n
the head noun through the relative clause formation. Deletion 
does not occur in this case. Also the coreference of zibun 
is not determined by a reflexive coreference condition but 
by a variable binding. The same thing can be said about 
the following example given by Alcmajian and Kitagawa (1976:
(30) Yuumeina sakka ga zibun no denki o kaita satoo syusyoo wa
famous writer self's^ biography wrote Sato prime minist*
zyookigenda 
good mood
"Prime minister Sato, self's (i.e. whose) biography 
a famous writer wrote, is in a good mood."
Relative Clause Binding also has ’the effect of BLPFDTNG the 
reflexivization rule (i.e. robbing it of possible inputs)."
As was demonstrated above, the reflexive coreference condition 
can work for Japanese examples. However, since Montague
F2
Taroo T zibun no oya ga sindeslmatta kodomotati o
atuineru^y
aturaeruIV,F10
zibun no oya ga sinde simatta
kodomotati o,T FI
zibun no oya ga sinde simatta kodomotati
zibunn no oya ga
sindeslmatta,t
kodomotati CN
■n
(18))
Thus as Aknajian and Kitagawa (1976:6?) point out,
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grammar cannot distinguish agentive from non-agentive, the 
reflexive coreference condition which includes the notion 
of an experiencer is not applicable to Montague grammar.
One limitation of Montague semantics lies here.
Here I will formulate the rule of relative clause 
formation as follows:
S. 16. If ^  ^ anC* ^  includes a free variable
f 13(^./3 ) e pt ,
where F 1^(^ /3 ) = /~/3 ol J t
T.16. if a  6 p , /b 6 Pt
and . /3 translates as ft' respectively, then
F^„(df/3) translates as ^ '( ^  A  ^^ J
(Cf. Montague:1974;261)
4.2. Japanese passivization
4.2.1. It is well known that there are two types of passives
in Japanese. One is the direct (or simple) passive, which
has a corresponding active sentence just like an English
passive. Note that the Japanese passive morpheme is /rare/.
(31)a. Taroo wa Hanako ni homerareta.
Taro Hanako by praise-passive-past.
"Taro was praised by Hanako."
b. Hanako wa Taroo o horneta.
Hanaka Taro praised.
"Hanako praised Taro."
The other is the indirect (or adversity) passive, which has 
no corresponding active sentence. Note that not only 
transitive but also non-stative intransitive verbs may 
be passivized.
A
(32)a. Taroo wa Hanako ni sinareta.
Taro Hanako by die-passive-past.
’’Taro was affected by Hanako*s death*”
b. Hanako wa sinda.
Hanako died.
’’Hanako died,”
Among transformational generative grammarians, 
there is controversy over Japanese passives which based 
on uniform versus non-uniform theories. Both positions 
are essentially in agreement over the deep structure of 
the indirect passive. Both of them assume a complex deep 
structure of the form
AUXNP
NP
ta
past
Taroo Hanqko sin- 
die
rare
passive
The morpheme /rare/ is regarded here as a matrix verb 
that takes an S as its object .
However, they disagree on the deep structure of 
the direct passive. Non-uniform theorists (Kuno;1973 5 
N.McCawley:1972; Harada, 1973) believe that the direct 
passive has a simpler deep structure and that a trans­
formational rate of permutation yields the surface structure. 
On the other hand, uniform theorists (Kuroda, 1965a;
Hasegawq,1968; Makino,1973i Howard and Niyekawa-Howard,1976) 
claim that the direct passive derives from the complex 
deep structure. For instance, Kuroda assumes the following 
deep structure for (31a):
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(34)
AUXNP
NP
rare
passive
ta
pastHanako Taroo homer- praise
Taroo
Now for both viewpoints there are crucial counter­
examples. Non-uniform theory cannot account for the scope 
ambiguity of attitudinal adverbs in the direct passive. 
This was first pointed out by Makino (1973)- He claims 
that the adverb unambiguously refers to the subject of 
the sentence in the active sentence (35*0 while it can 
refer to either the subject or the agent in the direct 
passive sentence (35h).
( 3 5 ) Taroo wa Hanako o iyaiya syootai sita
Taro Hanako unwillingly invite did
"Taro unwillingly invited Hanako."
b. Hanako wa Taroo ni iyaiya syootai sareta ,
Hanako Taro unwillingly invite do-passive-past
"Hanako was unwillingly invited by Taro."
On the other hand, uniform theory can account for the 
above ambiguity by postulating a complex deep structure 
for the direct passive. Namely, the non-ambiguity of 
reflexives in sentence (36) can not be accounted for by 
Kuroda's uniform analysis.
(36) Taroo wa Hanako ni zibun no uti de kOrosareta
Taro Hanako self's house kill-passive-past.
"Taro was killed by Hanako in self's^ house."
To remedy this, Howard and Niyekawa-Howard (1976) propose 
a Reflexive coreference constraint. However, Kuno (1978)b 
presents a number of counter-examples to this constraint.
Thus an adequate analysis of the Japanese passive still 
awaits discovery.
4.2.2. Next let us consider the problem of passives from 
the Montague grammar point of view. There is presently 
disagreement over English passive formations among Montague 
grammarians as to whether they are lexical or syntactic 
(cf. D. Dowty:1978a; E. Bach, 1980). I would like to 
consider whether the formation of the Japanese direct
passive should be by a lexical rule or a syntactic rule
k
in Montague grammar.
If we take a lexical approach,passivization is a 
category-change from a transitive verb into an intransitive 
verb. Hence passive verb phrases such as homerare "be praised" 
should be listed as a subclass of an intransitive verb 
among the basic expressions. The following lexical rule 
might be formulated:
(37)LI? If 9- 6 PT V , F^(di)6 ply* where ^  -rare
If ^  0 PTy* ^translates as^' , then
Fy^(&) translates as Xl. 3 / 2 ^  (Y)
Then the direct passive (31a) will have the following 
analysis tree.
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(38) Taroo wa Hanako ni homerareta. t
Hanako ni homerareru,IVTaroo
Hanako homerareru,IV
homeru TV
This analysis can account for the non-ambiguity of the 
reflexive zibun in the following example, since Taroo is 
the only subject in (39)*
(39) Taroo wa Iianako ni zibun no uti de homerareta
Taro Hanako self's house praise-passive-past
"Taro^. was praised by Hanako in self's^ house."
However, it cannot account for the scope ambiguity of 
adverbs which was first discussed by Makino (1973)* As 
the following analysis tree shows, a predicate adverb iyaiya 
can modify the IV phrase but cannot modify the TV phrase 
because the TV phrase should be among the basic expressions.
(40) Hanako wa Taroo ni iyaiya shootaisareta
Hanako was unwillingly invited by Taro."
Hanako,T Taroo ni iyaiya shootaisareru,^.,,
Taroo ni sliootaisareruiyaiya IV/IV IV
shootaisareruTaroo,T IV
shootaisuru , ^ r
Therefore, the lexical approach is inadequate to handle the 
Japanese direct passive. Moreover, the direct passive 
formation is lexically governed.
If we take a syntactic approach, passivization is a 
concatenation of a term and a transitive verb phrase.
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Passive verb phrases such as homerare are not listed among 
the basic expressions but formed by a syntactic rule. The 
rule might be formulated as follows; and the example of the 
analysis tree is given in (42).
(41) S.17. If ^  £ p t , /3 & PTVp, then F^cJ../?) g Piy, 
where F^(<^. fb) - cJt -ni /3 -rare.
T.17. If 6 PT , /3 £  Pxvp» then translates as
vi (/ (6' (aa rr ( xjjj c v))
(42) Taroo w^Hanako ni homerareta t. F^
"Taro was praised by Hanako.” 
Taroo,T Hanako ni JiomSrareru,
IV Fl4
Hanako,T homeru,^._TVP
This analysis can also account for the non-ambiguity of the 
reflexive zibun in (39)» but it cannot handle the scope 
ambiguity of adverbs. A revision will be necessary to 
account for the scope ambiguity of the above adverb in the 
example (40).
As Kuno (1973) points out, some intransitive verbs 
can undergo the direct passive formation, and hence a lexical 
rule could be a better option. However, the passivization 
cannot be formalized as the category change from TV to IV,
One possible solution could be to treat passivization as 
the category change from TVP to IV. TVP differs from TV;
TV is listed among the basic expressions, while TVP means 
” a phrase which works syntactically and semantically like 
a transitive verb.” (Cf. E. Bach, 1980:299) Then the 
passive rule can be formulated as below.
L. 17. If ^  6  PTVP* F l4(c^ ) & P i v » where F i4* ^  * = ~rare
/*#3* Japanese eausativizjation
4,3*1, The Japanese causative morpheme /snse/ was regarded
as an auxiliary verb by traditional grammarians, while
transformational grammarians treated it as a main verb
which takes the embedded sentence as its object. They
also divide Japanese causatives into O-causatives and
Ni-causatives and postulate different deep structures for
them. The two types of causatives are illustrated as follows
O-causatives with intransitive complements
Taroo wa Hanako o^ ikaseta.
Taro Hanako go-cause-past
"Taro made Hanako leave,"
b. Ni-causatives with intransitive complements.
Taroo wa Hanako nL ikaseta,
"Taro let Hanako leave,"
c. Causatives with transitive complements (which are 
ambiguous between 0 and Ni-causatives)
Taroo wa Hanako ni sakana o tabesaseta 
Taro Hanako fish leat-cause-past
"Taro made (or let) Hanako eat a fish,"
There are two conflicting transformational analyses of 
causatives. One of them is called the Ni-Extra analysis 
which postulates an extra NP in the matrix sentence of 
the Ni-causative deep structure, whereas the other, the 
0-Extra NP analysis, postulates an extra NP in the matrix 
sentence of the O-causative deep structure. The former was 
proposed by Nakau (1973) and supported by Inoue (1976b) and 
Tonoike (197^)* and the latter was proposed by Kuroda (1965a) 
and followed by Kuno (1973)* Shibatani (1976) anc* Harada 
(1973). The two types of deep structures are illustrated 
as follows.
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(44)a. Ni-Extra NP analysis (0-causative)
Taroo Hanako sase
cause
b. Ni-Extra NP analysis (Ni-causative)
Taroo Hanako Hanako ik 
(45)«. 0-Extra NP analysis (O-causative)
NPNP
NP
Hanako HanakoTaroo sase
cause
b. 0-Extra NP analysis (Ni-causative)
NP
NP
ik
go
Taroo Hanako sase
cause
Although Tonoike (1978) strongly argues for the Ni-Extra 
NP analysis, Kuno (1978b) points out that there is 
insufficient evidence to choose between the two conflicting 
analyses. Thus this problem is still unsolved.
What is missing in both the existing analyses seems 
to be an explicit semantics. When a deep structure is 
postulated, there is a heavy reliance on semantic evidence, 
but the semantics is undefined and far from truth conditional 
semantics. Let us review the semantics of Japanese 
causatives as studied by transformational grammarians.
Kuroda (1965a) states that Ni-causatives are 
characterized by involving the willingness of the causee 
and the O-causative by being indifferent to it. What is 
semantic is not defined and his vague intuition seems to 
be a guide to his method of judgment. Observe the 
following examples given by Inoue (1976b 1:70). They 
clearly show that Kuroda*s semantic distinction is not 
always maintained.
(64) Kare wa iyagaru imooto ni beddo de nesaseta
he reluctant sister bed sleep-cause-past
MHe made his reluctant sister sleep in the bed.1'
(^7) Kare wa iyngaru tuma ni hatarakaseta
he reluctant wife work-cause-past
"He made his reluctant wife work."
In these examples the causees ore not willing to perform 
the action, Kuno (1073) follows Kuroda’s semantic 
definition of Ni-cau«ntives but adds that the causee of 
O-causatives is forced into the action denoted by the 
complement, fli© claim is falsified by Kitagawa's (197;0  
following examples,
i'iPi) Taroo wa ynsai o Ikusaraseta
.*nij
Taro vegetable snoil-cnuse-past
’’Taro let the vegetable spoil,"
(A9) Isha ga byooninj o I sinaseta
l*ni j
doctor patient die-cause-past
"The doctor let the oatient die."
In these examples the causees are not forced to do the
actions. If we substitute tatu "stand" for sinn "die"
in (^9), the causee is forced to stand. Observe the
following example.
(50) Isha ga byoonin o tataseta.
doctor patient stand-cause-oast
"The doctor made the oatient stand."
This suggests that the apparent semantic distinction between 
the O-causative and the Ni-causative should come from 
lexical semantics. Although transformational grammarians 
postulate dualistic syntactic deep structure to nccount 
for the meaning difference between the O-causative and 
Ni-causative, logical syntax, which is based on truth 
conditions, does not assiime a semantic difference between them.
What has not been refuted by transformational 
studies of Japanese causatives is Harada*s (1973) and 
Kuno’s (1973) observations on the self-controllability 
of the complement verbs of Ni-causati\'e. They both claim 
that the complement of Ni-causatives must be self- 
controllable, Note that self-controllable predicates 
coincide with predicates which can form imneratives. 
Observe the following examples: where Ni-causatives ore 
unacceptable, because the complement verbs are not self- 
controllable .
(51)». Taroo wa Hanako o komaraseta.
Taro Hanako annoy-cause-past.
"Taro annoyed Hanako,"
*b. Taroo wa Hanako ni komaraseta.
"Taro allowed Hanako to be annoyed."
(52)a. Taroo wa Hanako o kanasimaseta.
Taro Hanako grieve-cause-past.
"Taro made Hanako grieve."
*b. Taroo wa Hanako ni kanasimaseta.
"Taro let Hanako grieve."
(*>3)e« Taroo wa ame o huraseta.
Taro rain fall-passive-past.
"Taro made it rain."
*b. Taroo wa am© ni huraseta.
"Taro let it rain."
(5^)«• Taroo wa bakudan o bakuhatusaseta.
Toro bomb exolode-cause-nast.
"Taro made a bomb explode."
♦b. Taroo wa bakudan ni bakuhatusaseta.
"Taro let a bomb explode."
This suggests that the Ni-causative is a subset of the
O-causative involving self-controllable action. From the
point of view of Montague grammar, the Ni-causative, which
is lexically governed, should not be generated by logical
syntactic rules.
4.3*2. Let us consider this problem in Montague grammar.
Dowty (1976) formalizes Comrie's (1976) PARADIGM CASE of 
causative constructions into three category-changing 
lexical rules. These are summarized as follows.
(55) 1* If the embedded verb is intransitive, then the
embedded subject becomes a direct object in 
surface structure.
a. If then Fc (<3») & QXV*
2. If the embedded verb is transitive, the embedded
subject becomes an indirect object.
b. I f ^  6 B„v, then FcBO 6 BTV/T-
3. If the embedded verb is a three-place verb,
then the embedded subject assumes another
oblique case or becomes the object of a preposition.
c. If 6 Btv/t, then Fc (&) 6 B (t v /T)/T
These lexical rules are not applicable to Japanese causatives. 
Firstly the O-causative formation is not lexically governed 
in contrast to the Ni-causative formation. Secondly, if we 
take a lexical approach, we cannot account for the 
ambiguity of the scope of adverbs, the ambiguity of 
reflexives, soo suru replacement and sentence pronominalization. 
These ambiguities of productive causatives are discussed by 
Shibatani (1976:245-251) vrho compares them with lexical 
causatives.
For instance, if the O-causative formation were due 
to lexical rules, it could not account for the ambiguity 
in the following O-causatives .
(56) Taroo^ ga Hanako^ o zibun^ no lit j de sinaseta.
Taro Hanako self's house die-cause-past.
"Taro-let Hanako. die in self's. . house."
* J ij
(56) will have the following analysis tree, if we take 
a lexical approach.
(57) Taroo ira Hanako o zibun no uti de sinaseta.
Taroo,T Hanao o zibun no uti de sinaseru
Han<\ko o sinafleruzibun no uti de IV/XV
sinaseruHanako TV
sinu,IV
The reflexive coreference condition (21) predicts zibun 
is only coreferential with the subject Taroo. Therefore 
a lexical approach will be abandoned. Moreover, the above 
ambiguity suggests that Hanako must be the subject 
somewhere in the derivation and so the syntactic approach 
is not taken either* The following analysis tree might 
be constructed for a syntactic approach.
(58) Taroo ira Hanako o arukaseta. "Taro made Hanako walk."
I propose to analyze Japanese O-causatives by a 
lexical syntactic operation, which takes a formula containing 
a free variable and yields non-sentential phrase os its 
output. Not only the above ambiguities oointed out by 
Shibatani but also the relation of logical consequence must
Hanako o arukaseru
Hanako,^, o-arukaseru TV
aruku,IV ’TV/IV
be accounted for by logical syntax and semantic analysis 
In all of the examples of causatives, the interpretation 
includes the proposition. For instance,
(59)a. Taroo ga Hanako o hasiraseru.
Taro Hanako run-cause
"Taro makes Hanako run.1
b. Hanako ga hasiru.
Hanako run
"Hanako runs."
(60)a. Taroo ga Hanako ni Kutu o hakaseru.
Taro Hanako shoes wear-cause
"Taro makes Hanako wear shoes."
b. Hanako ga kutu o haku.
Hanako shoes wear
"Hanako wears shoes."
In both examples, Hanako is a semantic subject that 
performs an action. Therefore, logical syntax invites 
us to analyze Hanako as the subject somewhere in a 
derivation. Then (59a) will have the following analysis 
tree.
Taroo ga Hanako o hasiraseru.^
X  "Taro made Hanako run
Hanako o hasiraseru
o-hasiraseru
The causative morpheme /sase/ is treated as a phrase of a 
category of TV/t, which takes a formula containing a free 
variable and forms a transitive verb. The following rule 
must be formulated:
S.l8. If PTV<t, /3&Pt , and /3 has the form xn K", then
f 15 (cJf/3) e ptv,
where F^(c^,/3) =
T. 18. If<^ 6 pTy/t » / ^ & P tf and fi has the form 'X'f) f s
then r ^  5 (c^ . /3 ) translates a s A j A y ' ^  {biC[
a ) )
transitive complements as in (60a). However, it seems to 
require a rule which converts Q_ into rrl. Observe the 
following analysis tree.
(62) Taroo ga Hanako ni sakana o tabesasetfl.^
This rule falls under the jo-ni rule which is said to 
correspond to a Japanese surface structure constraint by 
Shibatani (1975)* This surface structure constraint 
prohibits the double occurrence of the accusative c> in a 
sentence. Ostler (1980b) claims that the rule generates 
the following surface case arrays: the unrer figure giving 
the maximum, the lower the minimum number of instances.
This rule also can handle the o-causative with
"Taro made Hanako eat 
a fish.”
Taroo ga Hanako o sakana o tabesaseru. « F 2
Taroo,^ Hanako o sakana o tabesaseru. IV,F 10
Hanako,^ sakana o tabesaseru,^
x„ sakana o taberu,f
sakana o taberu
109.
(63) n o m ^ d a T q
This seems to suggest that logical syntax is inadequate 
to handle Japanese case relations which are purely 
syntactically induced.
There is a fine difference of meaning between 0-causatives
and Ni-causatives. However, it seems to me that the meaning 
difference between them comes from a non-logical part of 
meaning. We might be able to say that in the 0-causatives 
the causee is an experiencer, while in the Ni-causatives the 
causee is not an experiencer but a self-controllable agent. 
This distinction should be captured by lexical semantics. In 
the translation of 0-causatives the operator BECOME is 
included. This primitive might be better deleted for Ni- 
causatives due to self-controllability.
To handle purely syntactically induced case relations
such as a surface structure constraint, it seems necessary
to incorporate the level of a linguistic syntax. One of
examples for Japanese is Ostler's (1980b) phrase structure
grammar whose NP's are marked with case markers. This is 
given below.
(64) Phrase structure of simple sentences
a . S
b
c . V
d. NP P
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These phrase structure rules can handle Ni-causatives
as follows:
(62) Taroo ga Hanako ni sakana o tabesaseta.
"Taro made Hanako eat a fish.”
NP
r' N
NP
DAT ACC
Taroo-ga Hanako- sakana-o tabesaseta 
ni
Taroo-ga Hanako-o sakana-o tabesaseta
Taroo,, Hanako o sakana o tabesaseru.
F2
IV
F10
Hanako,T sakana o tabesaseru.
sase * TV/t
3,T sakana o taberu,
This suggests that linguistic syntax and logical syntax 
should be distinct fields of investigation, and that the 
interaction between them are most revealed in morphology. 
To develop Montague’s theory of grammar into a linguistic 
theory, it is necessary to incorporate the level of a 
linguistic syntax which is based on phonology.
Although the linguistic framework given above is 
not meant for a processing model, it is not far from the 
recent suggestions of psychologists such as Marslen-Wilson,
and Welsh (1978) and Johnson-Laird (1981). For instance, 
Johnson-Laird says:
The theory assumes that there are two main stages in 
comprehension. First, utterances are translated into 
a mental code that provides a direct linguistic 
representation of them. This stage concerns the 
identification of speech sounds, the recognition of 
words, and the recovery of superficial syntactic 
structure. Secondly, the linguistic codes may be used 
as part of the basis for the inferential construction 
of a mental model of the state of affairs that the 
utterance describes.
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Footnotes.
1. Zibuntati is a plural form of zibun, but plural 
suf.fixat.ion is not obligatory in (3*0*
1 22, Langacker (1969) says: "For NP to command NP , it
must be the case that the S-node which most directly
dominates NP* also dominates NP2 .
3# According to Kuroda (1965a)« the initial consonant 
"r" of the morpheme /rare/ drops when preceded by 
a consonant.
e.g. home-rare-ru homerareru "to be praised”.
oraow-rare-ru 4  omowareru "to be thought of”.
The form of niyotte passives as shown below are 
excluded from this fragment. Kuroda (1979) claims 
that they are transformationally formulated.
(i) Taroo wa Hanako niyotte homerareta
Taro Hanako by praise-passive-past
"Taro was praised by Hanako.”
5. I am indebted to R.H. Thomason (personal communication) 
for the formulation of intensional logic.
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Chapter 5: Japanese Negation and Presupposition
5*0. Semantics and pragmatics
Is there a clear-cut distinction between semantics 
and pragmatics? It is said semantics studies truth 
conditions and pragmatics studies speakers' meaning. Some 
linguists believe in a clear-cut distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics and exclude pragmatics from 
linguistics because of its unpredictability. However, the 
formalization of pragmatics has been advanced not only by 
philosophers, psychologists, and computer scientists but 
also by linguists such as Gazdar (1979) and Sperber and 
Wilson (1980). It cannot be denied that pragmatics is 
now a fashionable topic in linguistics.
I am convinced that pragmatics :.s part of linguistics 
not only through my studies of Japanese grammar but also 
from my experience as a non-native speaker of English. It 
is difficult for a non-native speaker of English to find 
not only semantic ambiguity but also pragmatic ambiguity, 
implication, and stylistic ill-formedness. Katz (1972:V*3) 
excludes pragmatics from linguistics, because he believes 
that pragmatics does not "reflect pure grammatical 
competence." It is not an issue here whether or not a 
theory of grammar is a theory of conrmetence, but 
the ability to detect pragmatic ill-formedness seems to 
belong to the native speakers' competence. Hence linguistics 
which aims to characterize the knowledge of language 
should include pragmatic rules.
Since Morris (1938) established the foundations of 
semiotics, the trichotomy between syntax, semantics and 
pragmatics has been basic to the studies of sign systems,
which include logic, mathematics, linguistics, aesthetics, 
etc. According to Morris, semantics studies the relation 
of signs to objects, pragmatics the relation of signs to 
the interpreter, and syntax the relation of signs to other 
signs. If pragmatics studies the relation of signs to the 
interpreter, the relation between the personal pronoun 
"I" and the speaker must be pragmatic. Influenced by Bar- 
Hillel (195**), Montague used the term "nragmatics" for his 
model-theoretic research on indexicality, which involves 
personal pronouns, demonstratives, modal.s, tenses, 
contextual ambiguity and so on. For instance,
(1) This is a book.
(1) cannot be considered true or false until the context of 
use is specified. Since most sentences are tensed, truth 
conditions must be determined at the level of pragmatics. 
However, this statement has been criticized by some 
logicians and replaced by the term "indexical semantics."
I think what matters is not to argue whether indexicals 
are semantic or pragmatic but to decide whether or not 
there is an interaction between semantics and pragmatics.
I will reject the Davidsonian view that truth conditions 
are independent of the context of use, and take the view 
that truth values are determined contextually. Hence a 
theory of truth should belong to pragmatics.
The Gricean principle of conversational implicature 
has been widely accepted by linguists as a theory of 
pragmatics in the broader sense of involving background 
assumptions between speakers and hearers. According to 
Grice (personal communication), Gricean maxims are rules
of* how to talk which transcend individual cultures and 
hence they are not the result of cultural evolution.
Grice (1975) gives the following maxims for the rules of 
conversation.
(a) Quantity .... Make your contribution as informative
as is required.
(b) Quality •••• Make your contribution one that is true.
(c) Relation •••• Be relevant.
(d) Manner ..... Be perspicuous.
However, Gazdar (1979) suggests that the Gricean rules of 
conversation might not be universal. It is an interesting 
problem as to how far Gricean rules are universal.
Moreover, since they are expressed vaguely, they need re­
formulation.
It is necessary to develop a theory of pragmatics 
suitable for use within Montague's universal grammar, 
Stalnaker's (1978) pragmatic principles are presented 
model-theoretically and although they are insufficient 
as a theory of pragmatics, they seem to work for Japanese 
discourse as well as English. He states the principles as 
follows:
1. A proposition asserted is always true in some but not 
all of the possible worlds in the context set.1
2. Any assertive utterance should express a nroposition, 
relative to each possible world in the context set and that 
oroposition should have a truth value in each possible world 
in the context set.
3. The same proposition is expressed relative to each 
possible world in the context set.
The first principle helps to disambiguate sentences 
contextually and the second principle concerns truth value
gaps which result from presupposition failure or 
vagueness* The third principle is useful for interpreting 
indexicals or proper names.
The other important advance is Kamp's discourse 
model* ’’The truth of a bit of discourse D in a model M 
is defined as the existence of a proper embedding into M 
of the representation of D,” The discourse model consists 
of discourse representations and discourse referents. The 
discourse representations or DR's, are formed in response 
to the discourse and their formations operate on the 
syntactic structure. For instance, the first sentence of
(2) induces the following DR:
(2) Pedro owns a donkey. He beats it.
U V
• •
Pedro owns a donkey
U = Pedro 
TJ owns a donkey 
donkey (V)
U owns V
The complete DR of (2) becomes:
M2
U V
9 9
Pedro owns a donkey 
U ■ Pedro 
U owns a donkey 
donkey (V )
U owns V
He beats it 
U beats is 
U beats V
(2) "is true in the model M provided there is an element
of IL. such that 4 F.<f (Pedro), d >  belongs to both F_, (own 11 M M ———-
and F,., (beats); and furthermore d is a donkey in M ••••• 
formally d 6 F^ (donkey), if we assume that common nouns 
are interpreted in the model by their extensions," There i 
a problem as to whether the truth of the discourse model 
is pragmatic or semantic, but still how can we demarcate 
semantics from pragmatics? The present tendency in 
linguistic pragmatics is to reanalyze logical properties 
as pragmatic properties, but this seems to have been 
recently taken to the extreme. One example is a 
scopeless analysis of negation and quantifiers. This 
chapter will deal with negation and presupposition in 
English and in Japanese, and argue against some recent
research which suggests that all the presuppositional
phenomena should be handled at the level of pragnmtics.
5.1. Logical structure of English and Japanese negation
(3) The present king of France is not wise.
This sentence has been one of the most discussed 
sentences amongst philosophers and linguists since it 
was first questioned by Russell (1905). Russell's theory 
of descriptions predicts that this sentence entails the 
existence of an unique king of Franee and that it is 
semantically ambiguous between the narrow-scone predicate 
negation and the wide-scope sentence negation as follows.
(^)a. The present king of France is non-wise,
b. It is not the case that the present king
of France is wise.
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Russell would say that (3) has two distinct truth conditions; 
when (4a) is true, there must be a unique king of France 
and he is not wise, when (4b) is true, either there is no 
king of France or there is more than one king of France, 
or there is a unique king of France who is not wise. Thus 
truth conditions of (4b) are disjunctive and non-specific.
The truth conditions of (4a) are included in (4b) and hence 
(4a) and (4b) have understandings that are privative 
oppositions.
This has been widely accepted among logicians, but
Atlas (1977) argues that (3) is not ambiguous between (4a) 
and (4b) but semantically general (Quine) and that the 
logical structure of (3) should be (4b) alone, since he 
believes that (3) fails standard ambiguity tests. However, 
as Zwicky and Sadock (1975) explicitly say, their ambiguity 
tests fail to test privative oppositions, it is no wonder 
that (3) fails standard ambiguity tests. Therefore there 
is no convincing evidence which supports Atlas* claim.
We are now in a position to consider the logical 
structure of Japanese negation. The following sentence 
(4a) is not ambiguous because the Japanese language 
syntactically distinguishes predicate negation and sentence 
negation. (4a) has a predicate negation reading only, (4b) 
sentence negation reading only, and (4c) shows that we 
cannot negate the existence of reference but (4d) can.
(4)a. Genfuransuoo wa kasikokunai•
PKF wise not
’’The present king of France is non-wise.”
b. Genfuransuoo ga kasikoi wake wa nai.
PKF wise not the case
”It is not the case that the present king 
of France is wise.”
c. *Genfuransuoo >va kasikokurtai, nazenara
PKF wise not because
sonzaisinaikara 
exist not
"The present king of France is non-wise, because 
there is no king of France.”
d. Genfuransuoo ga kasikoi wake wo nai, nazenara
PKF wise not the case because
sonzaisinaikara 
exist not
”It is not the case that the present king of France
i® wise, because there is no king of France.”
When we consider the logical relation of Japanese 
predicate negation and sentence negation, (4a) entails (4b)
but (4b) does not entail (4a). Therefore (4a) and (4b)
are not logically equivalent and hence Japanese predicate 
negation differs from sentence negation not only syntactically 
but also semantically.
Japanese sentence negation can be interpreted in 
a similar way to English contradiction negation discussed 
by Karttunen and Peters (1979:49). The following examples 
are given by them.
(5)a. John didn't fail to arrive. He wasn't supposed to 
come at all.
b. Bill hasn't already forgotten that today is 
Friday, because today is Thursday.
c. Mary isn't sick, too. Nobody else is sick 
besides her.
These English negative sentences are best translated into 
Jananose sentence negation ”.... wake wa nai” , or
”..... hazu wa nai.” Just as English contradiction negation
affects the total meaning including conventional imolicature 
(presupposition), Japanese sentence negation includes the
problem of use. Then there must be some interaction 
between semantics and pragmatics. For instance, it 
has been suggested by Kamp that sentence negation should 
be handled by a discourse model, which is one possible 
approach to handle this aspect of meaning.
I will here only formulate predicate negation for 
JFL, within which the negative morpheme /nai/ is a predicate 
operator that maps the predicate into predicate negation.
An example of predicate negation is as follows.
(6) Taroo ga nenai.j?0 t "Taro does not sleep."
Taroo,T nenai.^,
Fl6
neru.IV
S.19. I f d £  PIV, then F l6 (d ) 6 Ply,
where ^ ^ ( d  ) = d  -nai, where d  is a stem-form 
of d  •
T. 19. If d  £ Pjyi d  translates as d  ,
where F ^  ( d )  translates as \ X r-\ (^d/(^n)7
5.2. Arguments against an entailment approach
The proponents of an entailment approach, who 
claim that a single category of entailment is sufficient 
for semantics, have further extended their analysis of 
the definite description to include examnles like (7),
(8), and (9).
(7) John doesn’t regret having married.
a. because he is happy.
b. because he is a bachelor.
(8) John doesn't stop beating his wife.
a. because he hates his wife.
b. because he is unmarried.
(9) It isn’t John who is married to Mary.
a. because Peter is married to Mary.
b. because Mary is unmarried.
They insist that (7) (8) and (9) entail their complement 
clauses because of the acceptability of the coordination 
with (7b) (8b ) and (9b) respectively. Jowever, in Japanese 
which syntactically distinguishes sentence negation and
predicate negation, the translation of (7) (8) and (9)
can be disambiguated as follows. Namely only (10b), (lib) 
and (12b) in translation have sentence negation and can 
have the reading of (7b) (8b) and (9b) as follows.
(10)a. Hanako wa kekkonsita koto o kookaisinakatta nazenara
married regret did not because
siawase dakara. 
happy
"Hanako did not regret having married, because 
she was happy."
b. Hanako ga kekkonsita koto o kookaisita wake wa nai, 
married regret not the case
nanzenara mikonda^ara. 
because unmarried.
"It is not the case that Hanako regretted having 
married, because she is unmarried."
(11)a. Taroo wa turna o utu no o yamenakatta, nazanara
wife beat stopped not because
tuma o nikundeita kara. 
wife hated
"Taro did not stop beating his wife, because 
he hated his wife.”
b. Taroo ga tuma o utu no o yameta wake wa nai,
wife beat stopped not the case
nazenara mikon dakara. 
because unmarried
”It is not the case that Taro stopped beating 
his wife, because he is unmarried.”
(12)a. Hanako to kekkonsiteiru no wa Taroo janai,
married not
nazenara Ziroo ga Hrnako to kekkonsiteirukara. 
because married
”It is not Taro who is married to Hanako, because 
Jiro is married to Hanako.”
b. Hanako to kekkonsiteiru no ga Taroo dearu wake ga nai,
married not the case
nazenara Hanako wa mikondakara 
because unmarried
”It is not the case it is Taro who is married 
to Hanako, because Ilanako is itnmorried.”
ivhat is more interesting, the examples of predicate
negation cannot negate the truth of a subordinate clause
in any context. Note that the corresponding English
sentences are acceptable in some situations.
(13) * Hanako ga kekkonsita koto o kookaisita koto wa nai,
nazenara mikon dakara.
"Hanako has not regretted being married because she 
is unmarried.”
(1?*) * Taroo wa tuma o utu no o yameta koto wa nai
nazenara mikondakara.
"Taro hasn’t stopped beating his wife, because 
he is unmarried.”
(15) *Hanako to kekkonsiteiru no wa Taroo janai,
nazenara Hanako wa mikondakara.
"It is not Taro who is married to Hanako, because 
Hanako is unmarried.”
If the entailment approach were correct, the above 
examples should be all acceptable in Japanese. Wilson 
(1975:^) defines entailment as follows: a sentence S entails 
another P if and only if S is true P must also be true, 
and if P is false S must also be false--— and the negation 
of S will be t r u e t h e  last line is added later on p.8.) 
Because "the negation of S" is unspecified and unmarked 
negation in Language is internal (cf. T. Givon:1978:89), 
the negation of S ought not to be held to exclude internal 
negation. If the entailment approach is to be adequate 
even in Japanese, the predicate negation of (13) (1*0 and
(15) must be true. The unacceptability of them clearly 
shows that the entailment approach is inadequate in Japanese.
5.3* Arguments against pragmatic presupposition
One of the most important presuppositlonal logics 
was proposed by van Fraassen (1966, 1969), but as he 
himself admits it seems to be inadequate to handle all the 
presiippositional phenomena in natural languages. However, 
it cannot be denied that it had a great impact on linguistic 
research of that time. Van Fraasen (1969169) defines 
logical presupposition in terms of "necessitation" as 
follows:
(16) A presupposes B if and only if A )f-B and “7AJSB 
and draws the following distinction:
(a) choice negation: (not-A) is true iff A is false.
(b) exclusion negation: (not-A) is true iff A is not 
true and false otherwise.
In his system, the connective "and" is defined 
symmetrically; if A and 0 is false, then B and A is false.
where jf[ stands for "false" if A and B is a contradictionj.i
in the classical two-valued system, otherwise fJrf stands 
for However, the symmetry is not always maintained
in natural languages. A. and 5 may be false, while B and
X lack a truth-value. For instance,
(17) All of Jack's children are bald and Jack has children.
(18) Jack has children, and all of Jack’s children are bald.
(19) Jack has children.
when (19) i» false, (17) lacks a truth-value because (17) 
presupposes (19), while (18) does not. The corresponding 
Japanese examples behave in the same way as follows, though
(20) is not acceptable because it is a tautology.
(20) * Taroo no kodomo wa minna hngeds sosite Taroo ni wa
Taro's children all bald and Taro
kodomo ga aru. 
children has.
"All of Taro's children are bald and Taro has children.
(21) Taroo ni wa kodomo ga aru sosite Taroo no kodomo
wa minna hageda.
"Taro has children, and all of Taro’s children are bald
(22) Taroo ni wa kodomo ga aru.
"Taro has children."
Then Stalnaker (197*0 denied that "the simple 
conjunction and is governed by mysteriously complicated 
rules" and suggested that we should introduce pragmatic 
presupposition to explain this phenomena and retain a 
truth-functional account of "and". He suggested that the 
following sentence (23) presupposes (19) nragmatically:
(23) All of Jack's children are bald.
Pragmatic presuppositions are considered to be the background 
assumption between speakers and hearers and hence the
speaker can cancel the presupposition since it is purely 
pragmatic.
However, presupposition cannot be purely pragmatic
in the following Japanese example of predicate negation.
(2k)* Taroo no kodomo wa minna hage Ja nai, Taroo ni 
Taro's children all bald not and
kodomo ga nai 
children not
"All of Taro's children are non-bald, (they all 
have hair) and Taro has no children."
Moreover, the unacceptability of (20), which is due to the
tautology, cannot be explained pragmatically. I agree
that presupuosition linked with counterfactual conditionals
or the particle "even" are pragmatic, but I do not think
that we can remove all of presuppositions from semantics.
5.4. Factive presupposition in English and Japanese
The notion of factive presupposition was first 
advanced by P. Kiparsky and C. Kioarsky (1971) in their 
paper "Fact" and their object vas to examine the relation 
between syntax and semantics in the Fnglish complement system 
They claimed that in the following sentence (25a) "the
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speaker presupposes that the embedded clause expresses 
a true proposition and makes some assertion about the 
proposition" (cf. P. Kiparsky and C. Kiparsky:1971;3^8) 
but in the sentence (25b) the speaker does not so presuppose:
(25)a. I regret that it is raining. (factive)
b. I think that it is raining. (non-factive)
One of the characteristics of a factive sentence is that 
presuppositions are constant under negation. In the 
negation of (25a), the speaker is still presupposing the 
truth of the embedded sentence but not in the negation of 
(25b). Observe the following negative sentences.
(26)a. I don't regret that it is raining,
b. I don't think that it is raining.
After examining the syntactic and semantic 
characteristics of factive sentences, the Kiparskys intro­
duced the hypothesis that factive presuppositions are 
reflected in their syntactic deep structure. Hence 
theoretically they suggested the interrelation-ships of 
syntax and semantics. I do not agree with their hypothesis, 
since I do not believe in syntactic deep structure, nor do 
I agree with Wilson's (1975) claim that factive presupposition 
should be accounted for by pragmatic principles.
I would like to point out that the Japanese mark 
factivity morphologically to a certain extent. Observe 
the following examples.
(27) Taroo wa Hanako ga rusu dearu koto) o wasureteita.
J no
absent is to forgotten
"Taro has forgotten that Hanako was absent."
(28) Taroo wa Hanako ga rusu dearuf to | omotteiru
*kotoI 
*no J
"Taro thinks that Hanako is absent."
The koto and no clauses express factivity and jto clause
2
represents non-factivity.
According to the Kiparskys (1971^360), some English 
verbs "occur indifferently with factive and non-factive 
complements." Examples are anticipate, acknowledge, suspect, 
report, remember, emphasize, announce, admit, deduce, etc.
In Japanese, some verbs can take not only koto and rio but 
also t^ o. Observe the following examples of Kuno (1973 *• 220).
(29)a» Mary wa John ga kuru koto o kitaisiteita
come was-expecting
"Mary was expecting that John would come."
b. Mary wa John ga kuru no o kitaisiteita
c. Mary wa John ga kuru to kitaisiteita.
There are some subtle differences in meaning among these 
three sentences with verbs of expecting. In (29a) and (29b) 
the subject is certain that John would come, while in (29c) 
the expectation did not come true. This seems to be related 
to the non-presuppositional nature of to.
Next let us consider the factive verb know. In 
the following example, the truth of the complement is not 
always presupposed.
(30) John does not know that he passed the exam.
Japanese distinguishes between the factive and non-factive
uses siru "know" morphologically, namely kadooka "vhther or 
not" is used instead of koto/no in case of non-factive 
examples. The corresponding Japanese examples are as follows
(31)»* John wa siken ni tootta kadooka siranai (non-factive)
exam passed whether know-not
b. John wa siken ni tootta (kotol o siranai (factive)( n o  J
Moreover, even in the longer sequences, if koto/no is used 
in the embedded sentence, factivity is maintained. Observe 
the following example.
(32) Taroo wa tikyuu ga raarui koto o sitteiru kadonka siranai
earth round know whether know-not
"Taro does not know whether he knows that the
earth is round.”
In the infinite sequence, factivity is not clearly maintained,
since the intuition is blurred. However, it cannot be denied
that factivity is morphologically distinguished in Japanese.
Hence factive presupposition must be semantic in Japanese,
although the complementizer choice between no and koto is
pragmatic. Therefore, factive presupposition must be pa»t
of grammar at least in Japanese.
5.5. Arguments against a Gricean account of factive
presupposition
I will demonstrate that Wilson's Gricean account 
of factive presupposition is untenable in Japanese examples 
of predicate negation. According to V/ilson (1975-99)* the 
following sentence (33) has the possible interpretations 
(a)-----(e).
(33) John doesn’t regret that Bill is ill.
(a) John does not exist.
(b) Bill does not exist.
(c) Bill exists but is not ill.
(d) John exists and Bill is ill but John does not know that
Bill is ill.
(e) John knows that Bill is ill but he is not sorry about it.
She claims that (a)-----(c) are eliminated by appeal to
Gricean goals of conversation which is the avoidance of 
obscurity and ambiguity. Then (d) and (e) are the most 
likely interpretations of (33)* Since the most efficient 
way of conveying (d) would be 
(3^) John does not know that Bill is ill
(d) will be eliminated by the theory of conversation and
(e) only will remain as a possible interpretation.
However, in Japanese, which distinguishes predicate 
negation from sentence negation syntactically, her Gricean 
account does not work. The English sentence (33) can be 
translated into Japanese in four ways.
(35) John doesn’t regret that Bill, is ill.
(j) John wa Bill ga byooki dearu koto o zannen ni omovanai.
ill regret not
(predicate negation)
"John l.nows that Bill is ill but is not sorry about it." (e)
(ii) John ga Bill ga byookidearu koto o zennen ni omo*U
wake ganai (sentence negation)
not the case
"It is not the case that John regrets that Bill is ill."
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
(iii) John Bill ga byooki dearu koto o zannen ni omowanai.
(exhaustive-listing ga)
"It is John who does not regret that Bill is ill."
(iv) John wa Bill ga byooki dearu koto o zannen ni wa omowanai.
(contrastive wa )
"John regrets something, but not that Bill is ill.”
Since the predicate negation (i) can only have Wilson's
preferred interpretation (e), there is no need to appeal to
Gricean maxims.
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Recently Sperber and Wilson (19$0) have advanced a 
Neo-Gricean theory of pragmatics which completely rejects 
mutual knowledge as a successful condition of communication 
and maintains that the single principle of relevance is
sufficient for comprehending discourse. The principle of 
relevance is:
"The sneaker tries to express the proposition which is the 
most relevant one possible to the hearer."
Even if this principle can select the preferred interpretation
(e) for the English sentence (33)* it is obvious that it does 
not work for the Japanese example (35i).
Moreover, I am convinced that mutual knowledge is 
an optional condition for comprehension. This is shown most 
clearly in Japanese. One piece of convincing evidence is 
the anaphoric use of the demonstratives in the a-series.
There are three kinds of demonstratives in Japanese, that 
is, kn-series, so-series, and a-series. As Kuno (1973*283) 
points out, the a-series is anaphorically used when the 
speaker knows that the speaker and the hearer mutually know 
the referent, while the so-series is used when the speaker 
does not assume that mutual knowledge of the referent. Note 
in English "that" or "the" is used in either case. Observe 
the following example of Kuno:
(36) * Ki noo Yamada-san ni aimasita. An© (*sono) hito itumo
yesterday Mr. Yamada met that man always
genki desune. 
high spirits
"Yesterday, X met Mr. Yamada. That man is always in 
high spirits."
B. Hontoo ni soo desu ne.
true is "Indeed so."
Since the speaker knows that the hearer know's Mr. Yamada, 
ano is used and sono is ungrammatical. This suggests that 
mutual knowledge could be semantic in Japanese and 
optionally necessary in comprehension of discourse. I am 
convinced that mutual knowledge is part of discourse grammar 
and hence I will depart from the Neo-Gricean theory of 
pragmatics.
5.6. Psycholinguistic studies of factive presupposition 
The first psycholinguistic study of factive pre­
supposition in child language was made by Macnamara (1977) 
and his aim was to explore children's ability to generate 
presupposition and to infer indirect implication from them. 
He believes that such operations constitute part of 
linguistic competence although they are closely connected 
with the more general cognition. He also believes that 
Children learn language by assigning meaning to sentences 
and hence that presuppositions must play a crucial part in 
the learning of language.
He selected expressions that generate presuppositions 
and indirect implications, and told these stories to 20 
4-year-olds and questioned them about the relevant 
propositions. Stories and questions are as follows.
"Forget"
The following is the positive version:
"There once were two friends called Mary-Jane and Dick, 
They used to play together in Dick's backyard. Sometimes 
Mary-Jane would bring a big coloured ball that she had, and 
sometimes she would bring a truck, and she and Dick would
play with her ball or her truck. One day, Mary-Jane and 
Dick were playing together and they decided that they would 
play after dinner that night. They decided that Mary-Jane 
would bring one of her toys. They chose which toy she 
would bring and they were looking forward to playing with it. 
\fter dinner Dick came outside to wait for Mary-Jane. When 
Mary-Jane came outside, she forgot to bring the ball.”
The negative version was similar, but ended "she didn't 
forget to bring the ball.”
Questions (the same for both versions):
1. -ae Dick disappointed? (Indirect implication)
2. Did Mary-Jane have the ball with her? (Implicative)
3. Was Mary-Jane supposed to bring the ball? (Presupposition)
k. Was Mary-Jane supposed to bring the truck? (Control question)
Results.
Numbers of Correct Responses for Forget
Type of question
Story version
Positive Negative Both
1. indirect implication 17(Y) 19(N) 16
2. Implicative 20 ( N ) l8(Y) 18
3. Presupposition 19(Y) l8(Y) 17
k. Control 13(N) 12 (N) 10
All of the above 12 12 10
Note: The questions were posed to 20 children. The 
parenthetical letters indicate whether the 
correct response was yes or no.
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Then he concludes that many children aged 4 can grasp 
presuppositions and assign them truth values correctly.
”In other words, these children showed in certain cases 
understanding of* the semantic system which generates 
presuppositions and assign truth values to sentential 
complements” (cf. J. Macnaraara:1977’281).
I carried out a similar experiment with my six- 
year-old daughter who has mastered an English grammar which 
is almost indistinguishable from an adults. She can 
correct the grammatical mistakes as follows:
(37)a • *John have a dog.
b. John has a dog.
(38)a. *John has beat a dog.
b. John has beaten a dog.
(39)a* *Mary is beat by my mother,
b. Mary is beaten by my mother.
(40)a. *Mary did not saw the moon,
b. Mary did not see the moon.
(41)a. *You can television watch, 
b. You can watch television.
(42)a. *John loves herself,
b. John loves himself.
(43)a. *Mary is a girl pretty.
b. Mary is a pretty girl.
(44)a. *John is tall than Mary,
b. John is taller than Mary.
(45)a. *1 saw her clever.
b. I think she is clever.
(46)a. *1 stop read a book.
b. I stop reading a book.
(47)a. *1 heard Mary sang,
b. I heard Mary sing.
(48)a. *1 should can read a book.
b. I should be able to read a book.
(49)a. *1 wish I am a mother,
b. I wish I was a mother.
(50)a. *1 wish I can go there,
b. I wish I could go there.
Next I asked the following sentences (51) (52) ( 
to my daughter.
(51) Mary doesn’t regret having married, 
because she is unmarried.
(52) Mary doesn’t stop beating her baby, 
because she has no baby.
(53) It isn’t John who is married to Mary, 
because Mary is unmarried.
She failed to understand the above sentences which are 
counter-examples to the presuppositional approach.
Since a five to six years-old child is considered to 
have mastered a grammar which is indistinguishable 
from an adult grammar, I think (51) (52) and (53) do 
not exist in her grammar. The entailment approach 
seems to develop much later in English.
5.7. A model-theoretic approach
If* we take the Davidsonian truth definitions, 
factive presupposition should be handled at the level of 
pragmatics. This is because Davidson defines truth by 
pairing two true sentences. Hence truth-values have nothing 
to do with the context of use. If the determination of 
truth-values depends on a common background set of 
assumptions between speakers and hearers, then Davldsonians 
would have to regard this phenomenon as pragmatic.
However, if we take the model-theoretic approach, 
which determines truth-values contextually, factive pre­
supposition can be accounted for truth-conditionally* This 
approach was first taken by Peters (1979) for factive 
presupposition. He attempted to formulate factive pre­
supposition using the direct interpretation into model theory 
rather than adding a special component to intensional logic. 
He said,
"In conversation, what counts is not truth of a sentence's 
presupposition in the actual world, i.e., relative to the 
reference point which indexes the actually existing state 
of affairs. The important thing is rather truth relative to 
the shared background assumptions of the conversationalists." 
Imagine we lived before Galileo was born. If I said, "I 
know the earth is flat," it was a true sentence at that time. 
Thus the truth-value depends on the discourse. This approach 
seems to be sufficient for Japanese factive presupposition.
This idea was further developed into a discourse 
model by Kamp (MS). He argues that "the truth of a bit of
discourse D in a model M must be defined as the existence 
of a proper embedding into M of the representation of D."
If we take the discourse model theoretic approach, 
we can account for factive presupposition without assuming 
the existence of the common ground but use the existence 
of embedding of a discourse D into a model M. Moreover, 
solutions can be found for other controversial problems 
such as quantifiers, pronouns, negation, etc. by a discourse 
modeI.
In this chapter, I have argued against some recent 
research which claims that all the presuppositional phenomena 
should be accounted for at the level of pragmatics. I have 
suggested that if we change the theory from truth theory 
into model theory and further into a discourse model,factive 
presupposition turns out to be truth conditional. Therefore, 
before we argue what is semantic or pragmatic, we must 
examine which type of theory of truth is used. I conclude 
that Davidsonian truth conditional semantics is inadequate 
as a semantic theory of natural languages and if it is 
applied to natural languages it treats some parts of semantics 
as pragmatic.
Footnotes
1. The context set is "the set of possible worlds recognized 
by the speaker to be the "live options" relevant to 
conversation, (Cf, R. Stalnaker;1978:321)•
2, This was observed by S. Kuno (1973:213)*
Chapter 6: A fragment of JFL
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6.1. The syntax of a fragment of Japanese 
(i) Syntactic categories
t, or the category of declarative sentences, is the 
basic category t.
CN, or the category of common noun phrases, is the 
basic category CN.
XV, or the category of intransitive verb phrases, is 
the basic category IV.
T, or the category of terms, is to be t/IV.
TV, or the category of transitive verb phrases, is
to be IV/T.
IV/IV, or the category of IV-modifying adverbs.
t/t, is the category of sentence-modifying adverbs.
IV/t, is the category of sentence-taking verb phrases.
TV/IV, is the category of IV-taking transitive verb phrases.
IV//IV, is the category of IV-talcing verb phrases.
TV/t, is the category of sentence-taking transitive verb 
phrases.
(ii) Basic expressions
BCN
BIV
inu, otoko, onna, I 
dog man woman J
hoeru, hasiru, aruku,
bark run walk
Taroo, Ziroo, Hanako. kare , zibunn n
Taro J iro Iianako he self
a,TV
BIV/IV
o-tniru, o-matu, o-yaraeru, / 
see wait stop J
{ sibasiba, kasikokumo, yukk U-rito, 
) often wisely slowly
at/t kanarazusimo, ainiku, -rasii, necessarily unfortunately likely
- nitigainai, 
must
-kamosirenai
might
BIV/t
BTV/IV
to-oraou, to-sinjiru,
think believe
to-omou, to-sinjiru, no-o-miru,
think believe see
no-o-matu, 
wait
BIV//IV
• tai, -tagaru, -dasu, -hajimeru
wont show a sign start begin
of
B TV/t s < -sase,i cause
1**2.
(iii) Syntactic rules, lexical rules and morphological rules 
S .1• PA for every category A.
L.2. If <5- 6 Fcn, then F j Q ) ^  PT , where F^A) = Jol T
S.3. IfcJ-e PT , and/ 3 6 P IV, F2 (cJ /3)g PT .
M.l. ( + S. 3) If 6 6 Pjy anc* /3 has a Generic IV-operator,
FGn^./3) = ^ -wa /3
where the particle w£ i» attached to 
M.2. (+S.3) If £ £, PT , /3 £ Piy and ,<3 has an Event IV-operator,
PEV(^  ®  s ^  "££• /3 .
where the particle jga is attached tool •
S.**. If^ 6 PIV, F3(c^ ) 6 PIV, , where F 3<di) = Z £ r & )  IV,
s.5. if-^6 PIV* *V<^) 6 piv* • where iv
s.6. If a 6 P I V / I V  and*3 6 PI V 1 f5(^/ ,/3 ) g P I V ,
where F_(c2 Ch)
S.7. If S  e Pt/t a n d / 3 g P t , F6 (^./3)^Pt . 
where /3) = fh
S .8. If ^  6 PT and /3 g P t , F? (cJ. ^ 3) £  Pt ,
where F^(d>./'d) comes from /3 by replacing the first 
occurrence of a variable Xn by •
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5.9. If ^  e PT , and /3 t Pt, Fsae(^,/2> ) 6  pt ’
where F (^ ft) ) comes from /$ by replacing the
S d 6  *
first occurrence of a variable X by 4. sae.n ■- —
5.10. I f d  e PT , and 6 Pt , Fw a (^./3)6’ Pt . 
where F (o| ) comes from by replacing the
W  3  /
first occurrence of a variable by J, w a ,
L.ll. if d\ g PT V » F8 ^  )&  P'pv/iv* where f8 = —
S. 12. I f c ^ g P TV/IV a n d / 3 g P IV, F9 (o),/3) 6 Px y , 
where F^c*, /3 ) = TV*
S.13. Ifcifi PTy and /3 g PT , F 10( ^ ^ ) g  P Iy, 
where F 10(ol,/3) Iy.
L.14. If g Piv/t* then Fll(c^ * &  PTV/IV
S.15. If £ 6 Piv//IV aUd &  & PIV» F12(oi/3> 6 Piv 
where F 12(d./i) = ( /3ol ) j y
S. 16. If ^  6  P CN, and /3 g  Pt and /3 includes a 
free variable,
f 13< <=*, ft> ) 6  pt ’
where F^(c^, /3 ) = £ /3 ^  ^  ^ •
L.l/. If G- Pxyp , i! ) £ PIV,
where F ^  -rare
5.18 . If ^  £ Ptv t and ft ^ PT and ft has the form 
then $) £ pT V t where F^lcX./?)) = t~ct
5.19. If -k £, PTV, then F 1A( ^ n) £  pTV,, where F l6(d9 = ^  -nai,IV, ----  * l6w  ' ^ * IV'
where is a stem-form of
(iv) Examples.
L.2. Inu-wa hasiru,t
inu. CN
”Dogs run.”
S.3* M.l. Inu-wa hasiru,t F2,F n
inu.T, wa-hasiru IV'
inu. CN
”Dogs run.”
S.3. M.2. Inu-ga hasitteiru,t
inu.T
inu. CN
"Some dogs are running.”
S.**. Inu-wa hasiru,t
F2-FGn
inu.T wa-hasiru.
inu. CN hasiru, IV
”Dogs run.”
5. Inu-ga hasitteiru. t "Some dogs are running.”
v
ga-hasiru.IV,inu.T
inu. CN hasiru. IV
6. Taroo wa yukkurito aruku. t f,Taro walks slowly.”
V  FGn
Taroo.,p wa-yukkurito aruku.^, p
yukkur i t o aruku.
F,
y u k k u r i t o . a r u k u . ^
7. Ainiku Taroo ga kita. t "Unfortunately Taro came
6
ainiku, T/T Taroo ga kita,
8. Taroo ga kita,t "Taro came.”
kga kita.tTaroo,
9* Taroo sae kita.
Xga kita.tTaroo,
"Even Taro came.”
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S.10. Taroo wa kita.t
wa
Taroo,, Xga kita.
/
"Taro came."
L. 11.
S.12. Taroo ga Hanako ga aruku no o mita.
S.13 F2*FEV
Taroo,T "Taro saw Hanako walk."
ga-Hanako ga aruku no o miru. IV
F10
Hanako,,p ga-aruku no o miru.
ga-aruku,IV, no-o-miru,Ty/][V
8
aruku. IV o-miru. TV
bakada to omotteiruTaroo wa Hanako
Taro thinks Hanako to be stupid
Hanako o bakada to omotteiruTaroo IV. F 10
bakada to omotteiruHanako •T TV
to omotteirubakada TV/IVIV
to omotteiru,
15. Hanako wa arukidasita.
F2
t "Hanako started walking
H a n a k o a r u k i d a s u . ^
aruki,IV
F12
dasu. IV//IV
16. Taroo ga kaita hon "A book Taro wrote."
Taroo wa Hanako ni homerareta t "Taro was praised 
by HanakoF2
Hanako ni homerareruTaroo IV
homerareruHanako
homeruTVp
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S.18. Taroo ga Hanako o hasiraseta,t "Taro made Hanako run
Hanako o hasiraseruTaroo ’T IV,
10
o-hasiraseruHanako TV,
X 0 hasiru TV/t
hasiru,^vX
S.19. Taroo ga konakatta. "Taro did not come."
16
konaiTaroo •T IV*
k i\ ru,IV
Chapter 7:
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Conclusion
In this thesis a logical syntax has been constructed 
for a fragment of ordinary Japanese by using Montague’s 
theory of grammar. To do this it was first necessary to 
develop some points of Montag\ie’s theory in relation to its 
application to Japanese examples and to indicate why this 
theory is preferable by comparing it with other currently 
held theories.
One such set of comparisons was with Davidsonian 
truth theoretic semantics where it was found that truth 
theory cannot exactly handle modal notions such
(1) It is necessary that water is ^2^*
Model theory can be developed to handle this type of sentence 
and the consequent modal notions by incorporating into 
it the concept of possible worlds. When this is done it 
is possible to capture the semantics of ordinary language 
which deals in such ideas rather more easily than through 
truth conditional semantics.
It was also pointed out that truth theory cannot 
account for some important examples of structurally valid 
inference although model theory can.
The semantic form of adverbs in Japanese, as in 
English, offers difficulties to linguistic theories. In 
particular the Davidsonian logic has problems when it is 
used to tackle intensions! adverbs and again it was shown 
that Montague’s grammar is more efficient in analysing these.
In matters relating to tense, it was noted that 
truth theory cannot readily capture the context sensitivity 
of tense. Montague attempted to do this by introducing
indices which specify features relevant to the discourse 
at a chosen moment of time. Kamp on the other hand 
developed model theory into a discourse model and in this 
proposed to treat tense as discourse referents. Model 
theory is one that allows a more simple and direct 
application of the theory to natural languages.
Also of interest in this analysis is possible world 
semantics. Although this has a wide acceptance among both 
philosophers and linguists the basic philosophical concept 
of 'possible worlds' causes much trouble to both groups.
It was pointed out that this need not be so despite the 
fact that Lewis' literal view of possible worlds is one of 
the most famous. The equally well known inadequacy of this 
theory where it deals with counterparts can be bypassed if 
Kripke’s views are accepted. Here it was shown that 
counterfactual situations should not be identified with 
possible worlds and that a possible world is defined by the 
descriptive conditions that we associate with it. It is 
also interesting that Kripke should maintain that possible 
worlds should be scientifically discoverable.
Montague grammar was also compared with transformational 
grammar. This is an intriguing comfarison as in both there 
is an assumption of linguistic universals although this is 
not clearly stated in Montague grammar. However, the 
methodologies for dealing with language analysis are vastly 
different with transformational grammar assuming that natural 
language is an elaboration by the human mind of some simpler 
linguistic universal. This analysis relies heavily on the
native speaker's intuition as to the meaning and forms of 
the sentences. On the other hand Montague grammar accepts 
natural language as formal languages and seeks to analyse 
it through a set of precise of mathematical rules and 
thereby arrive at what, at its minimum level, is set of 
universal categories.
It is also of interest to compare Montague's 
methodology with that adopted by many philosophers where 
often it is the subtleties of language that are discussed. 
What Montague has attempted is to retain the precision of 
their arguments but also develop a formalism capable of 
dealing with both syntax and semantics. In as far as 
Montague's grammar attempts to deal with this duality it is 
a radical departure from the current philosophies of language
If a comparison is made between model-theoretic 
semantics and the linguistic semantic theories then Katzian 
translational semantics is the closest to model-theoretic 
semantics. However, while both of them are compositional, 
Katzian semantics is not explicitly truth conditional.
Katzian semantics deals with the relation between 
natural language and its literal meaning so that it 
effectively translates the natural language into its semantic 
representation. On the other hand model theoretic semantics 
concerns the relation between language and the world it 
represents and in this case the role of semantics is to 
assign denotations to each linguistic expression so that 
for Katzian semantics translation represents the final stage 
of the analysis whereas for Montague Grammar translation is 
used only as an intermediary step in between assigning
natural language to its model-theoretic interpretation.
V-e note that a central feature of Katzian semantics is 
word meaning but at this time there is argument over 
whether word meaning should be a part of formal semantics.
Another approach to formal semantics would be to 
base it on syntactic categories. To do this using 
transformational grammar could be difficult as the syntactic 
categories are determined through the application of 
transformations to sentences. However, it would seem that 
in some applications transformational operations depend on 
a knowledge of meaning and hence to use a transformational 
theory of syntactic categories to produce a formal semantics 
would introduce a degree of unreliability. In comparison 
Montague grammar is based on a categorial grammar which 
automatically provides a logical syntax. This also confers 
the further advantage that it can be systematically trans­
lated into a corresponding semantic type unlike Chomsky's 
phrase structure grammar which is based on the autonomy of 
syntax and relies on unanalysable symbols such as NP and VP 
that have no semantic relevance.
These results were combined in chapter two to 
construct the first fragment of a Japanese Formal Language.
The starting point was to note that in Japanese the generic 
reading is translated into sentences using the particle w^ . 
whereas the event reading into a sentence using jta. In 
general this view would be acceptable to most Japanese 
although there are differences in terminology. However Sakai, 
who was broadly using Montague Grammar methodology, proposed
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translating thematic wa sentences into necessary truth.
This view was not accepted in this thesis and an analysis 
based on an analogy with Carlson’s unified analysis of 
the bare plural was developed. As a result of this the 
generic use of wa was found to be a generic predicate operator 
and in the same way the descriptive use of jga as an event 
predicate operator. Through this analysis a discrepancy 
is revealed between linguistic syntax, which is based on 
morphology, and logical syntax which is based on truth 
conditions. There is nevertheless a link between lingriistic 
syntax and logical syntax through morphological rules.
In fact, if these morphological rules are understood 
in a wider sense to deal with any linguistic regularity 
relating to phonological phrases or words, then they are 
capable of further development. In the present example the 
generic wa and descriptive j£a (subject marker) are predicate 
operators in the underlying semantic structure, are also 
attached to the subject phrase by morphological rules and 
are phonologically considered to be enclitics. This area 
of linguistics while being of great interest is also extremely 
complex involving as it does the interactions between 
phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
In Sakai’s treatment of adjectives and verbs they 
are both considered to function as declarative sentences. 
However this is to ignore morphological, syntactic and 
semantic distinctions and the forcing together of the 
adjectives and verbs results in great strains to his theory. 
If, as shown here, the two distinct categories are maintained
then Japanese adjectives can be fairly naturally handled 
by the predicate theory of adjectives.
Further to translate manner adverbs into the type 
((S,t)t), as Sakcpdoes, gives rise to problems. For example 
sentence adverbs cannot be handled by this system. The 
method used here is to treat manner adverbs as predicate 
operators and a sentence adverb as a sentence operator.
Chapter three took as its task a comparison of 
Montague grammar and Transformational grammar when used to 
analyse various Japanese linguistic constructions. As 
examples verbs of perception taking the sentential norainizer 
no were considered. Here the method was found to be that of 
Carlson's event level predicate. Subject raising was also 
considered and examples such as
(2) Taroo ga kita rasii "It is likely Taroo came" 
were most simply analysed as a combination of a sentence 
and a sentence operator rasii. Subject to object raising 
was examined and sentence forms like -
(3) Taroo wa Hanako o bakada to ornotteiru 
Taro thinks Hanako to be stupid
were analysed by a lexical rule based on Montague Grammar.
Verb raising was next looked at and a typical example such as
(4) Hanako wa arukidasita "Hanako started walking" 
was seen to be a concatenation of the IV phrase with the 
IV//IV phrase.
Lastly desiderative sentences were considered and 
examples where the verb takes the morpheme /tai/ examined 
as in the example:
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(5) Hanako wa raizu ga nomitai "Hanako wants to drink water." 
Here the analysis suggested that a morphological rule 
exists that replaces o^ with ga.
In the case of every example the Montague Grammar 
based analysis was considered to have advantages over the 
Transformational Grammar analysis.
In chapter four the comparison between Transformational 
and Montague Grammars was continued and neither theory was 
able to fully deal with the formations considered. First 
to be examined was Japanese reflexivization a subject which 
had been largely ignored by traditional grammarians. The 
first major studies were by transformational grammarians 
who made a number of interesting observations. These were 
discussed and it was concluded that a reflexive coreference 
condition which contains the notion of an experiencer was 
necessary. This raises a problem because as formulated 
Montague grammar cannot handle the notion of an experiencer.
The study of passives presents the problem that 
there is no agreement at present between Montague grammarians 
as to whether they are syntactic or lexical in English. For 
Japanese an attempt was made to analyse the direct passive 
by a lexical rule. However this approach was unable to 
handle the scope ambiguity of attitudinal adverbs.
Japanese o-causatives were also examined using an 
analysis based on a lexical syntactic operation. The 
difference between o-causatives and ni-causatives lies not 
in logical semantics but in lexical semantics.
Moreover, it was proposed to incorporate
phrase structure grammar into the theory at the level of 
linguistic syntax. This new linguistic framework seems 
to coincide with some recent psychological research which 
suggests that there are two main stages in comprehension.
The first stage concerns phonetics, word recognition and 
surface syntax while the second stage provides a mental 
model derived from the first. The discourse model which 
includes mental representation belongs to the second stage.
At the beginning of chapter five the question was 
posed as to whether there was a relationship between 
semantics and pragmatics and whether there was a clear 
demarcation between semantics and pragmatics.
Having considered this an attempt was made to analyse 
Japanese predicate negation using Montague's theory of 
grammar. It was then suggested that Japanese sentence 
negation should be handled by a discourse model. It was 
further argued that not all of the Japanese presupnositional 
phenomena could be handled at the level of pragmatics. It 
was especially noted that in Japanese fnctivity is marked 
morphologically. If we take a model-theoretic approach here 
noting that it determines truth values contextually then it 
is able to account for Japanese factive presupposition truth- 
conditionally. A discourse model can also handle this 
problem semantically.
Another theoretical concern at this point was to 
determine how far it is possible to translate natural 
languages into intensional logic. Although it was found to 
be possible to handle adjectives and factive presupposition
by this means it was seen that direct interpretation by 
model theory was a better method. Montague's PTQ 
framework which translates material into intensions! logic 
can therefore be used as a tool for semantic analysis since 
it will provide an explicit semantics but it must be noted 
that it is not all powerful and does have limitations.
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